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This study examines the effects of the discretion allowed in fair value accounting on 
manager selling decisions of Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Grounded in motivated 
reasoning and prospect theory, the discretion permitted for Level 3 fair value assets and 
liabilities is predicted to have behavioral consequences. The study employs a 2 X 2 between- 
participant design, manipulating a conservative level of the discretion used to ascertain the fair 
value (more or less conservative) and the volatility of the historically recognized fair value (low 
or high). Both graduate students and accounting professionals were asked to read a case scenario 
and make selling decisions regarding a pool of Level 3 fair value assets purchased six quarters 
ago. The results indicate that the discretion of the conservative level affects the asking price 
although the volatility of historically recognized fair values does not significantly influence 
accounting professionals’ selling choices. In a comparative analysis, as volatility increases, the 
 
 
 
 
difference in the asking price increases between the graduate student sample and the professional 
sample. Additionally, this study provides support that discretion of the conservative level does 
not affect the likelihood to sell the security, but rather affects the asking price and the lowest 
price willing to accept if participants were to sell the Level 3 fair value security. These findings 
contribute to the fair value accounting literature by providing new insights on the effects fair 
value discretion has on manager decision-making as well as contributing evidence to the fair 
value accounting relevance debate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Accounting academics and practitioners have been debating the reliability and relevance 
of fair value accounting. According to Financial Accounting Standards, fair value accounting, 
often referred to as mark-to-market occurs when a firm revalues assets and liabilities based on an 
exit price (FAS 157). Advocates contend that fair value provides valuable and timely information 
to financial statement users by increasing transparency that aid in assessing firm value (CFA 
2008). In contrast, opponents argue that fair value is transitory because once the asset or liability 
is traded, the related accounting entries are reversed. Thus, fair value may provide misleading 
and unreliable information (ABA 2009). In particular, Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities 
have no observable inputs and are valued by managers’ assumptions, thus the fair value is 
subjective (Zyla 2013). This study contends that the discretion afforded by accounting standards 
in valuing Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities creates a bias in managerial decision-making. 
Specifically, this study examines whether the assumptions used in determining the recognized 
Level 3 fair value of assets and liabilities subsequently influences managers’ selling decisions of 
the Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. 
Level 3 fair values are unique in that subjective assumptions that are necessary to arrive 
at the fair value are based on unobservable inputs. According to the FASB codification glossary, 
unobservable inputs are defined as “market data that are not available and that are developed 
using the best information available about the assumptions that market participants would use 
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when pricing the asset or liability” (FASB 2014: 820-10-20). Depending on the valuation method 
selected, discretion can include the expected life of the asset or liability, the cash discount rate, 
and risk return rates (Zyla 2013). This discretion can affect financial statements. For example, 
Inco Ltd. and Enron used discretion allowed with fair value accounting to inflate the value of 
assets on the balance sheet, which in turn suggests that the firms had greater economic benefit 
than their operations indicated (Hilton and O’Brien 2008; Benston 2006).  
Prior literature has established that factors such as earnings management (Dechow and 
Shakespear 2009; Dechow, Myers and Shakespear 2010), optimism (Kedia and Philippon 2009), 
national culture (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000), fear of litigation (Lobo and Zhou 2006), and 
auditor compliance (Milbradt 2012) influence the recognized fair value. However, limited 
research has examined how managerial behavioral effects prior to recognizing fair value (Chen, 
Tan, and Wang 2013). Furthermore, research has yet to investigate the implications discretion 
has on managers’ selling choices of Level 3 fair value securities, which can amount to millions 
of U.S. dollars in investments.
1
 Therefore, this study can provide useful information not only to 
directors of firms that invest in Level 3 fair value securities but also to regulators and financial 
analysts. 
Using experimental methodology, this study explores the effects of the valuation and the 
historical pattern of the recognized fair values on managers’ selling decisions.2 The dependent 
variables examine managers’ selling choices and include managers’ likelihood of selling, the 
requested asking price, lowest price willing to accept, and likelihood of accepting an offer below 
fair value. In addition, to avoid sunk cost fallacy and other potential confounds, this study only 
                                                          
1
 For instance, Bank of America has over $44 million invested in Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. 
2
 From an experimental design perspective, since the “true value” of Level 3 assets or liabilities is never known, this 
study does not attempt to determine an “actual” value of the security. 
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considers a gain context where the recognized fair value is greater than the historic cost in all 
treatment conditions. 
Motivated reasoning theory contends that individuals will perceive information in a 
manner that will benefit their desired outcome (Kunda 1990). Thus, managers are likely to view 
a fair value that results in gains as a valid representation of the true underlying value. Because of 
the resulting unrealized gains, managers will be motivated to base Level 3 fair value selling 
decisions at the fair valuation amount. Further, prior literature suggests that when making 
decisions, individuals use the most recent information available as a reference point (Baucells, 
Weber, and Welfens, 2011). Accordingly, because this study only investigates a gain setting, 
managers are expected to rely on the most recent recognized fair value when making Level 3 fair 
value selling decisions, despite knowledge of the assumptions used to arrive at the recognized 
fair value. Thus, the expectations are that managers will select a selling price based on the most 
recent recognized fair value. 
When examining manager’s likelihood to sell a Level 3 fair value asset or liability, 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests that only unrealized gain from the 
increase of the recognized fair value will motivate managers to be risk averse. In order to 
preserve the unrealized gain, managers will not sell the asset or liability if the market offers a 
price less than the most recent recognized fair value. 
Moreover, fair value discretion influences the historical volatility pattern of recognized 
fair value estimates. This volatility generated from fair value assumptions is different from the 
underlying volatility that the market creates and over which managers or firms have no control. 
Motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) argues that historically consistent fair values will create 
greater confidence that the recognized fair value estimate accurately reflects the underlying value 
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of the assets and liabilities. In turn, this will cause managers to request an asking price that is 
greater than the current recognized fair value when the fair value is stable.   
Furthermore, prior literature links information volatility and uncertainty (Bourgeois, 
1985). Specifically, the research supports that greater volatility historical pattern of recognized 
fair value will induce managers’ uncertainty of the expected future fair value of the asset or 
liability. When managers have an unrealized gain from the fair value, prospect theory argues that 
they will be risk averse in gain settings and risk seeking in loss settings, based on their reference 
point (Sullivan and Kida 1995). Accordingly, in order to avoid risk, this study predicts that 
managers are not only more likely to sell volatile fair value securities over securities with less 
volatile past fair values, but also will sell at a lower price. 
In summary, this study predicts that in a scenario in which the fair valuation is more 
(less) conservative, managers are expected to be more (less) likely to sell the Level 3 fair value 
security. Further, if managers were to sell the security, they will select an asking price that is 
equivalent to the most recent recognized fair value. In other words, if the firm were to use more 
(less) conservative fair value recognition policy, the manager will opt for a more (less) 
conservative asking price. If the market offers a price below the most recently reported fair 
value, then managers are expected to hold the securities. When low volatility of the historic fair 
value pattern is present, managers should have an asking price similar to the recognized fair 
value. However, when high volatility is present, managers will decrease their selling price and 
increase their willingness to sell.  
By exploiting the comparative advantage of a behavioral experiment, this study examines 
how the assumptions used to arrive at the recognize Level 3 fair values influences subsequent 
manager selling decisions of those fair value securities. In a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, the 
amount of recognized fair value (more or less conservative) and the volatility of historically 
 
 
5 
 
recognized fair value (low or high) are manipulated. The participants consist of graduate students 
from a large Mid-Atlantic university and accounting professionals obtained from Qualtrics Panel. 
This study finds that the conservatism level (e.g., whether securities have a fair value that 
is higher or lower) for discretion of Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities affects the asking 
price when making selling decisions. Thus, fair value is relevant when determining an asking 
price. Yet, opposite to expectations, the conservatism level does not influence managers’ 
likelihood of selling the Level 3 fair value securities. When securities have a historical fair value 
pattern that is stable, managers’ asking price is similar to the most recent fair value. Conversely, 
as the volatility of the historical pattern of fair value increases, managers’ asking prices increases 
when more conservative discretion is used. Less conservative discretion also results in increasing 
the likelihood to sell Level 3 fair value securities below the fair value and more conservative 
discretion results in greater likelihood to retain the securities rather than to sell below the fair 
value. Thus, when less conservative discretion is used, managers have a higher asking price but 
are also willing to accept an offer below the fair value. This study also provides evidence that the 
historical volatility alone does not statistically affect the asking price, but rather interacts with 
the conservative level in the professional sample. Lastly, the supplemental analysis shows that 
both conservative level and volatility influence the amount managers’ asking price deviates from 
the recognized fair value. Overall, this study finds that managers’ selling decisions are 
influenced greater by the conservative discretion level rather than the volatility.  
This study makes four primary contributions to the accounting literature. First, and 
importantly, this study provides evidence that fair value information is relevant when making 
selling decisions. This study contributes to the fair value literature by demonstrating that fair 
value discretion influences managers’ selling decisions of fair value securities. This influence 
may cause managers to sell a Level 3 fair value asset or liability at a lower price than if other 
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discretion levels were used. Through increased knowledge of the behavioral repercussions that 
fair value discretion has on manager decision-making, directors may be able to align firm 
objectives and management behaviors by adjusting fair valuation practices. In turn, because fair 
value adjustments affect financial statements, the discretion used may influence decisions of 
those who rely on those statements. In summary, through a better understanding of the effects 
that Level 3 fair value assumptions have on manager decisions, firms may be able to avoid 
consequences connected with fair value accounting, such as selling at a price below the fair value 
or refusal to sell over-valued assets and liabilities.  
Second, this study adds to the fair value accounting relevance debate by identifying 
consequences that result when conservative levels are used in the discretion allowed for Level 3 
fair value securities selling decisions. Extant scholarship examined the connection between fair 
value accounting and manager decisions (e.g., Chen, Tan, and Wang 2013; Wang 2010; Plantin, 
Sapara, and Shin 2008), though no research of which I am aware analyzes the influence of fair 
valuation on managerial selling decisions.  
Third, this study is timely in that the Federal Reserve recently announced that student 
loans, a Level 3 fair value security, which are purchased by institutions as investments, have a 
default rate of 11.3% of the $1.16 trillion of outstanding student loans (Shah, 2015). Although 
since 2010, banks have stopped funding federal student loans (Federal Student Aid: An Office of 
the U.S. Department of Education, 2015), there are still bank funded federal student loans 
outstanding that are traded as Level 3 fair value securities. The subjectivity allowed to arrive at 
the fair value can result in managers incorrectly valuing and retaining these investments in 
student loans that may default. Through understanding how Level 3 fair value discretion 
influences manager-selling decisions, firms can implement policies to prevent managers from 
retaining overvalued securities.     
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Fourth, this study adds to the discussion of accounting convergence between IFRS and 
U.S. GAAP. The IASB has adopted fair value accounting measures and has agreed with the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on a fair value definition and disclosure 
requirements (IFRS). Therefore, the importance of understanding consequences of fair valuation 
is important on a global scale.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The second section consists of 
the literature review and hypotheses development, and the third section outlines the methodology 
for this study, which is followed by the data analysis and results in Section four. Section five 
concludes with study limitations and suggestions for future research.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Fair Value Accounting 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) recently agreed on a definition for fair value. According to the 
Accounting Standard Codification 820 and IFRS 13, “Fair value is the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date” (ASC 820; IFRS 13). Further, the objective of fair value 
accounting is to increase relevance and reliability
3
 of accounting information over historic cost 
accounting (Barlev and Haddad 2003). Despite the aim of the implementation of fair value 
accounting, its contribution to relevance remains under debate.  
Opponents of fair value accounting argue that the fair value of the asset or liability does 
“not match up well to the ideal of the hypothetical frictionless competitive market” (Plantin, 
Sapara, and Shin 2008: 436) and, therefore, fair value accounting offers limited information 
value (Benston 2008; Hilton and O’Brien 2009; Nelson 1996). Further, they suggest that changes 
in fair value are transitory because accounting entries reverse when the asset or liability matures 
or is sold (ABA 2009) and is therefore unnecessary.  
Using the examples presented in SFAS 157 Implementation Guidance, Benston (2008) 
contend that fair value accounting does not provide relevant information. He indicates that firms 
                                                          
3
 For information to be relevant, the “accounting information must be capable of making a difference in a 
decision… Financial information is capable of making a difference when it has predictive value, confirmatory value 
or both” (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, 2013: 46). For information to be considered reliabile, the accounting 
information must represent what has occurred and the information is free from material error, neutral and complete.   
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tend to erroneously include transaction cost when calculating the exit price to increase fair value. 
Certain assets should have a negative carrying value on the books, yet fair value accounting 
allows firms to carry these assets at substantially higher values. Benston further argues that the 
fair value of some assets and liabilities create an opportunistic environment because of discretion 
in determining fair value and the difficulty for external auditors to uncover misreporting. He 
concludes that fair value accounting offers little value relevance to information users.   
Further, Nelson (1996) investigates the effects of SFAS No. 107, Disclosure about Fair 
Value of Financial Instruments. She finds that fair value disclosures do not provide any 
explanatory power. Once she controlled for future profitability, she finds that fair value 
disclosures provide explanatory power. However, this results in lack of relevance of the fair 
value securities.  
In a study of Inco Ltd., a company in the nickel mining industry, Hilton and O’Brien 
(2009) investigate the impact fair value accounting has on managers’ write-down decisions. 
They provide empirical evidence that managers’ use discretion over the timing and extent of 
asset write-downs to keep the assets overvalued on their books. Therefore, their study provides 
evidence that adds to the negativity connected with the subjectivity in fair value accounting. In 
another study, Benston (2006) argues that fair value led to the demise of Enron, in particular 
Level 3 fair valuation. Managers at Enron used discretion of Level 3 fair value energy contracts 
to hide overwhelming losses because their compensation was based on the fair value of these 
contracts. 
Conversely, proponents argue that fair value accounting is value relevant because it 
reflects the trading price of an asset or liability. Plantin et al. (2008: 436) state that fair value is 
“a measurement system that reflects transaction prices that would lead to better insights into the 
current risk profile of firms so that investors could exercise better market discipline and 
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corrective action on firms’ decisions.” Prior research provides evidence that fair value 
accounting practices provides greater relevance in decision-making than historic accounting 
practices (Blankespoor, Linsmeier, Petroni, and Shakespear 2013; Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo 2011; 
Dunbolt and Rees 2008; Barth 1994). 
Penman discusses the differences between fair value accounting and historic accounting. 
He argues that in fair value accounting, “the balance sheet satisfies the valuation objective, and 
the income statement provides information about risk exposure and management performance” 
(2007: 36). In other words, fair value accounting seems to provide a greater wealth of 
information over historic accounting. Lauz and Leuz (2010) discuss the extent fair value 
accounting contributed to the 2008 financial crises. They counter the arguments that fair value 
intensified the financial crises and found that these claims are unfounded. They conclude that in 
times of crises, fair value accounting does not exacerbate security write-downs. Rather, they 
claim that there are regulatory mechanisms in place to prevent excessive write-downs.    
A recent study provides support that the fair value of financial instruments in the banking 
industry provide relevant information. Blankespoor et al. (2013) investigate whether the fair 
value of financial instruments provides a greater explanation of banks’ credit risk. They 
demonstrate that the fair value of financial securities explains greater variation in banks’ credit 
risk over a U.S. GAAP method that uses a mixture of historic values and fair values. Thus, their 
study provides support that fair value accounting is relevant.    
In addition, Barth (1994) examines securities in the banking industry by comparing fair 
value estimates to historical costs and provide support for the notion that fair value estimates on 
securities gains and losses has relevant explanatory power in the market. Further, Ahmed et al. 
(2011: 70) investigate “the association between changes in fair value derivatives and changes in 
non-derivatives positions” and provide evidence that fair value provides relevant and transparent 
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information to aid investors’ decisions. In addition, Dunbolt and Rees (2008) examine fair value 
relevance of firms specializing in real estate and investment trusts. They compare fair value and 
historical accounting information, and find that when balance sheet values are unambiguous, fair 
value provides more relevant information than historic accounting practices. In summary, 
although fair value accounting creates opportunities to distort information, prior research 
provides evidence that the fair valuation of assets and liabilities has explanatory power on 
decision-making purposes. Thus, fair value accounting can provide relevant information to users.  
Impact of Fair Value Adjustments on the Financial Statements 
The fair value accounting treatment for assets and liabilities differs based on the length of 
time the manager intends to hold that asset or liability. The length of time dictates whether 
changes in fair value are identified in the income statement or the other comprehensive income 
statement. When revaluation of the fair value of an asset or liability occurs, the adjustment is 
recognized on the balance sheet. If the asset or liability were listed as a trading security intended 
to be held for three months or less, then unrealized gains and losses appear in the income 
statement as part of operating income. If the security were classified as an available-for-sale 
asset or liability intended to be held between three months to an indefinite period, any gains or 
losses appear in the Other Comprehensive Income Statement. When either classification of 
security is traded, any realized gain or loss is recognized in the income statement.  
Fair Value Hierarchy 
Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, arranges the 
source of information used to determine the fair value of assets or liabilities in a hierarchy of 
three levels. Level 1 uses observable inputs to determine the fair value, such as quoted prices 
from an active market. Level 2 inputs are indirectly observed through quoted items from 
comparable assets or liabilities. The market approach, which can be used to obtain Level 1 and 
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Level 2 fair values, “uses prices and other relevant information generated by market transactions 
involving identical or comparable assets, liabilities, or groups of assets and liabilities, such as a 
business” (ASC 820-10-20, 2014). In addition, the highest and best use valuation approach may 
be used to obtain Level 1 and Level 2 fair values. This method is “determined based on the use 
of the asset by market participants even if the intended use of the asset by the reporting entity is 
different” (FAS 157-42-C36, 2014). 
Level 3 fair value estimates differ from Level 1 and 2 in that the inputs used are 
unobservable and derived from managers’ assumptions. Further, Level 3 fair values are unique in 
that there is no market or comparable asset or liability to determine a value (Kieso et al. 2013; 
Zyla 2013). Therefore, managers’ discretion used to determine the value of these assets and 
liabilities. Any discretion used to arrive at Level 3 fair values are recognized in the balance sheet 
while in the income statement or the other comprehensive income statement to reflect the 
economic value (Penman 2007). 
Because Level 3 fair values have unobservable inputs, fair value measurement uses other 
methods to determine the recognized value. These methods include the income approach, the 
cost approach, and the calibration method. The income approach converts future amounts into 
their present value. According to ASC 820 codification, fair value measurement using the 
income approach uses the present value of market expectations. This method estimates the 
expected cash flows the asset will generate over the estimated useful life. Then the firm 
discounts the sum of the estimated cash inflows by a risk-adjusted rate of return (Zyla 2013). The 
cost approach, or current replacement cost, is the value that reflects the cost to replace the asset. 
This method uses the estimated current replacement cost of a comparable asset with equivalent 
utility adjusted for obsolescence. Specific assets such as buildings, or intangible assets such as 
customer relationships or personnel, require the cost approach (Zyla 2013).  
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A relatively new method that evolved with efforts toward convergence between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS is the calibration valuation method. This valuation requires unobservable inputs 
and therefore is limited to Level 3 fair value calculations. At the initial valuation of the asset or 
liability, the fair value of the item and the transaction price are calibrated so that they are equal. 
In subsequent periods, fair value adjustments will highlight the difference between the observed 
transaction price and unobservable inputs that were not initially captured by the valuation 
method (Zyla 2013).  
 In summary, there is a fair value hierarchy. Classification in the hierarchy uses the inputs 
available to determine the fair value of the asset or liability. Level 1 and Level 2 have observable 
inputs or external values available to use as the fair value or as a benchmark when arriving at the 
fair value. However, Level 3 fair values use unobservable inputs to arrive the fair value that is 
recognized on financial statements. 
Discretion in Level 3 Fair Value 
A common occurrence with the income approach, the cost approach, and the calibration 
method is that they require judgment or discretion regarding the inputs (Zyla 2013). For 
example, the income approach requires the user to estimate the discount rate of return and the 
useful life. The cost approach requires the user to determine the cost to replace the asset or 
liability. A Level 3 fair value has no comparable items to use as a benchmark. Therefore, 
discretion is necessary to determine what constitutes a similar asset or liability and what 
necessary adjustments are required to account for obsolescence.   
In a Monte Carlo simulation, Folpmers and de Rijke (2010) valued mortgage-backed 
securities, Level 3 assets, using a combination of observable and unobservable inputs. Their 
simulation results in a large dispersion of fair values. In other words, managers have a great deal 
of discretion when selecting a value within a range of possible values. In addition, accounting 
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guidance dictates that in many cases “the applicable financial reporting framework does not 
prescribe the method of measurement or may specify an alternative method for measurement” 
(AU-C Section 540-A22, 2014). This means that managers also have discretion regarding the 
method selection used to ascertain the fair value. Further, managers have the option to select 
multiple valuation techniques. However, once a firm selects a valuation technique, the method 
must be used consistently (Kieso et al. 2013). Managers have the option to change the method 
provided the new fair value technique provided if managers believe that the new technique 
provides a more accurate measure.  
Generally, fair value estimations are a function of numerous inputs and estimation 
methods that can vary among assets and liabilities within each company (Zyla 2013) resulting in 
numerous possible fair values. Therefore, this results in significant discretion available to 
managers when determining not only the value of the inputs, but also which inputs to include in 
the model. A valuation expert acknowledges the complexity: 
“Full valuation of level 3 assets is both an art and a science, says Cindy Ma, a 
board member of the International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC), the 
international standard setter for global valuation standards and the valuation of 
complex, illiquid assets. ‘There is no hard and fast rule of what the valuation 
range will be. Valuers use several pricing methods to triangulate a range, which 
will depend on factors such as asset class, geography, the age of the asset, 
illiquidity and the availability of comparable securities.’” (Cusworth 2012; 
www.risknet.com). 
 
Despite managers’ discretion arriving at a fair value, prior literature demonstrates that 
Level 3 fair value is reliable and relevant to information users. Kolev (2009) examined the value 
relevance at each of the fair value hierarchies and finds that investors view managers’ 
assumptions surrounding Level 3 estimates as reliable. In an archival study, Song, Thomas, and 
Yi (2010) find evidence that the market responds to Level 3 fair values assets and liabilities. 
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They provide support for the notion that investors perceive a greater value relevance for fair 
value security if the firm has strong corporate governance.  
In summary, managers have discretion over the recognized Level 3 fair value. In 
particular, managers have discretion regarding the method used, the inputs used in the method, 
the values of those inputs, and the ultimate selection of the recognized fair value. Yet, despite the 
numerous estimates made by management, Level 3 fair values provide relevant information used 
by decision-makers. 
Fair Value Influences Decision-Making 
Aside from fair value providing relevant information, prior scholarship examines several 
aspects of the effects fair value accounting has on investors (Kadous, Koonce, and Thayer 2012;  
Koonce, Nelson and Shakespear 2011), analysts (Hirst, Hopkins, and Wahlen 2004), and 
manager decision-making (Chen et al. 2013; Wang 2010; Plantin et al. 2008).  
Investors 
Fair value accounting affects both sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors during 
the decision-making process. Using multiple experiments, Koonce et al. (2011) examine whether 
investors’ decisions will be contingent in various fair value settings. They find that investors 
believe that the fair value of assets is more relevant than the fair value of liabilities. In addition, 
investors are likely to find fair value relevant when trading securities in the short term. Kadous et 
al. (2012) extend fair value relevance research to include reliability. Employing an experimental 
methodology, they provide support for the notion that financial statement users link fair 
valuation reliability to relevance. This study has implications in the field of fair value accounting 
judgments in that, if users do not perceive the information as reliable, they will deem the fair 
valuation measure as irrelevant when making decisions. 
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Analysts 
Using analysts as participants, Hirst et al. (2004) examine the effects of fair valuation on 
risk and value judgments. They find that when banks use full fair value measures, when all fair 
value adjustments are recognized in income, analysts are better able to distinguish fundamental 
risk from share characteristics as opposed to when banks use piecemeal fair value measures, 
when some fair value adjustments are recognized in income and the remaining adjustments are 
disclosed in footnotes. Hirst et al. suggest that because analysts do not distinguish risk properly 
when using a fair value piecemeal method, their judgments are not adhering to the market 
efficiency concept because they are not adjusting to all available public information. These 
results are important to the fair valuation literature in that they furnish evidence that differences 
in fair value recognition can influence decisions of even sophisticated specialists.  
Managers 
In an analytical study, Plantin et al. (2008) demonstrate how marking-to-market and 
historic accounting can lead to biases in managerial decision-making. They develop models that 
compare historic accounting and fair value accounting finding that each method has 
shortcomings depending on the life, the liquidity, and the seniority of the asset or liability. For 
example, when using historic accounting practices, if the asset has appreciated, managers are 
likely to have no inducement to use their negotiation skills when selling the asset, resulting in an 
inefficient sale price of the asset.  
In an economic experiment, Wang (2010) investigates the impact fair value has on 
decision-making in a bargaining setting. In particular, he examines the effects fair valuation has 
on negotiations between managers and verifiers in bargaining games. He provides evidence that 
when managers and fair value verifiers, or consultants, are negotiating a fair value over a range 
of possible values, and the contract between the manager and the verifier is renewable, the 
 
 
17 
 
agreed upon value is over-stated in favor of the manager. In an experiment using students, the 
manager made few concessions from his or her initial value in a renewable contract setting. 
Conversely, when the contract was for one period, the agreed fair value was under-stated and 
favored the verifier. This study provides evidence that managers can make concessions that 
result in agreed upon fair values that deviate from the initial fair value estimate. The managers in 
the experiment did not anchor on the initial fair value in the one period contract setting. This 
implies that there are circumstances surrounding fair valuation decisions in which managers are 
willing to adjust from their initial position.  
Chen et al. (2013) perform an experiment to test the effects of fair value accounting on 
managers’ real economic hedging decisions. Using a sample consisting of accounting 
professionals, Chen et al. (2013) find that, in the presence of fair value accounting and economic 
information, accounting professionals are likely to make sub-optimal investing choices, such as 
not hedging an investment when the information provided suggests that hedging is necessary. 
Yet when managers have only economic information, they are likely to make sound hedging 
choices. Therefore, Chen et al. (2013) provide evidence that an unintended adverse effect arises 
from fair value accounting.  
More or Less Conservative Fair Values 
 
Typically, once managers and/or valuation experts determine possible fair values, 
managers have discretion regarding the recognized fair value. Managers may have incentives to 
select fair values within the range that can be more or less conservative. Prior research finds that 
managers can be enticed to use discretion to select a less conservative fair value to manipulate 
earnings (Dechow and Shakespear 2009; Dechow, Myers and Shakespear 2010), to align with 
manager optimisim (Kedia and Philippon 2009). Conversely, managers can also select more 
conservative Level 3 fair values due to national culture creating a tendency to report more 
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conservative accounting estimates (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000), fear of litigation (Lobo and 
Zhou 2006), or avoidance of auditor scrutiny (Milbradt 2012).  
Prior literature provides support that managers may manipulate earnings through 
selecting Level 3 fair values that are less conservative. Due to the subjectivity surrounding the 
assumptions of fair value measurement, managers act opportunistically to increase firm values. 
Examining asset securitization, Dechow et al. (2010) find a negative association between income 
from securitization activities and income from non-securitization activities. They interpret this 
finding to indicate that managers use discretion over fair value accounting to smooth earnings. In 
a response to this study, Barth and Taylor (2010) caution that Dechow et al.’s (2010) findings 
“do not speak to whether discretion in fair value estimates is the source of earnings 
management” (27) because fair value estimates for securitized income only provide a limited 
opportunity for earnings management. Instead, Barth and Taylor (2010) contend that the greatest 
source of opportunistic behavior stems from managers’ securitization decisions. However, 
Dechow and Shakespear (2009) establish that because managers can opportunistically select 
which assets to securitize, the discretion provided by fair value allows managers with 
opportunities to manage earnings.  
These studies support the notion that Level 3 valuation discretion creates earnings 
management opportunities and offer evidence that firms may choose values that are less 
conservative. Of course, not all managers or firms that select the less conservative Level 3 fair 
values are participating in earnings management behavior. Managers may be optimistic (Kedia 
and Philippon 2009), which could result in managers being less conservative in their estimates. 
Penman (2007) states that because managers tend to be optimistic, their fair value estimates may 
be affected. In turn, if managers are overly optimistic without any real basis for their optimism, 
then accounting information may be biased as a result of their fair value estimates. 
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On the other hand, firms may have policies for transparent accounting,
4
 resulting in a 
firm culture with a preference for more conservative fair values. In addition, managers may have 
incentives to behave conservatively. For example, the passage of Sarbanes Oxley in 2002 caused 
managers to report more conservatively due to the CEO and CFO certification of financial 
statements (Lobo and Zhou 2006). Fear of possible litigation may also cause managers to err on 
the side of caution and report more conservative fair values (Basu 1997). Also, national culture 
may influence an organization’s conservatism. For example, Ball et al. (2000) find that firms 
located in common law countries have more conservative reporting tendencies than firm located 
in code law countries. In addition, firms that have conservative accounting practices have higher 
returns on equity than firms that do not have conservative accounting practices (Cheng 2005). 
This can entice managers to report conservative values. Furthermore, managers may be 
apprehensive of selecting a less conservative fair value due to increased audit risk (Milbradt 
2012). A less conservative recognized fair value may alert auditors to possible overstatement of 
accounting estimates and result in more substantive audit procedures (Arens, Elder, and Beasley 
2008). 
Accordingly, managers have incentives to recognize a Level 3 fair value that can be 
either more or less conservative. These incentives include earnings management, adhering to 
company culture, national culture, or avoidance of auditor scrutiny. Any of these motives can 
influence managers’ discretion when selecting a fair value within a range of values.  
Selling Decisions  
When investigating selling decisions of fair value securities, prior literature states that 
reference points, the perceived value of the asset or liability, affects the decision-making process. 
                                                          
4
 For instance, Costco announced their corporate mission is to increase financial transparency and to use 
conservative accounting practices (Galanti 2013). 
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When making a decision, individuals develop and use a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Loss aversion is associated with reference point determination in decision-making 
scenarios (Bromiley  2009). Baucells et al. (2011) investigate the decision-making  process when 
indiviudals are given a sequence of information. They demonstrate that the most recent 
information available recieves the greatest weight when forming a reference point in a decision-
making process. The significance of that information decreases once new information becomes 
available. Therefore, managers are expected to use the most recent recognized fair value when 
making Level 3 fair value selling decisions.  
Motivated reasoning argues that people “are more likely to arrive at the conclusions they 
want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly 
reasonable justifications for these conclusions” (Kunda 1990: 480). When individuals have a 
desired outcome, they are likely to view the information (e.g., fair value recognized) that benefits 
their objectives (e.g., a gain) (Marks 1951). Mishra, Mishra, Rixom, and Chatterjee (2013) 
contend that motivated reasoning has two factors that influence decision-making. The first is 
whether the individual is motivated to pursue the outcome. Mishra et al. (2013) argue that if the 
individual’s desire to pursue the outcome increases, they are likely to justify actions to achieve 
that outcome. However, if their desire diminishes, the individual’s search to justify actions 
should also decrease. The second factor relates to the ability to alter information in their favor. If 
the facets that influence the ability to justify pursuing the desired outcome are open to 
interpretation, individuals can distort these facets in order to justify their sought-after outcome. 
Therefore, motivated reasoning suggests that a manager is likely to distort the information 
provided, whether the recognized fair value is more or less conservative in order to justify that 
the information is accurate. This distortion is due to the manager pursuit of a desired outcome, 
which is to recognize a gain. When the manager desires to sell the security, he or she should 
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justify the selection of a more or less conservative recognized fair value as an accurate 
representation of the true underlying value of the asset or liability.  
Therefore, this study predicts that when a firm selects a Level 3 fair value that is greater 
than the historic value, motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1990) postulates that even though the 
manager is aware of the assumptions used to arrive at the subjective value, he or she should still 
believe that fair value is accurate because of the unrealized gain. This is because the manager 
will view the unrealized gain from the fair value adjustment as favorable, and will justify that the 
fair value accurately represents the true underlying value of the asset or liability. Thus, when 
selling a level 3 fair value asset or liability, the conservative level of the assumptions used will 
influence managers’ asking price. If more conservative assumptions were used, then managers’ 
asking price is likely to be lower than if a less conservative fair value were chosen because the 
recognized fair value is perceived to reflect the underlying value. On the other hand, when a firm 
recognizes a less conservative fair value, motivated reasoning theory posits that managers are 
likely to seek a higher asking price when selling the asset.  
In summary, the discretion over whether to select a more or less conservative Level 3 fair 
value should affect managers’ selling decisions. Motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1990) 
suggests that when managers make selling decisions, they are likely to believe that the fair value 
recognized is an accurate representation of the underlying value of the asset or liability despite 
knowing that the fair value recognized is more or less conservative within a range of values. 
Accordingly, motivated reasoning and prior literature leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities that are based on less conservative 
assumptions will cause managers to have a higher asking price for the security if 
they were to sell the security, than if the fair value measure was based on more 
conservative assumptions.  
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The selection of more or less conservative fair values are also likely to influence 
management’s decision regarding whether or not to sell the asset or liability. The valuation 
adjustments made when re-valuing Level 3 fair value of the assets or liabilities affect the balance 
sheet. In turn, these figures affect financial ratios, which external parties, such as lenders or 
investors, use when evaluating the firm.   
Milbradt (2012) argues that Level 3 valuations cause managers to avoid trading the assets 
or liabilities. When a firm purchases or sells Level 3 fair value assets or liabilities, they 
reevaluate fair value assets and liabilities they still own. If the firm needs to keep their leverage 
artificially inflated, managers are likely to suspend trading in order to avoid this revaluation. 
Furthermore, he states that managers tend to suspend trading in order to keep ratios from falling 
beneath a required firm or lender ratio threshold.  
An asset or liability with less conservative recognized fair values on the financial 
statements affects financial ratios. When managers sell this Level 3 fair value asset or liability, 
U.S. GAAP requires the firm to reverse the entries in order to remove the security and the 
corresponding adjusted fair value (Kieso et al. 2013), resulting in a change in the firms’ financial 
ratios. For example, a manager has a range of fair values to select from between $80 to $100 for 
an asset. If the manager were to recognize the least conservative fair value of $100, and if the 
market were only willing to pay $90 for that asset, then this will impact financial ratios, such as 
the current ratio. This is because the accounting treatment will remove the carrying value of the 
security ($100) and will increase cash ($90). This will result in assets decreasing by $10 and 
thereby affecting financial ratios that include assets. 
Prospect theory postulates that when individuals make decisions, they tend to consider 
the potential gain or loss associated with the outcomes creating a gain function that is concave 
while the loss function is steeply convex (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In other words, people 
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are generally more risk averse when the setting is framed as a gain as opposed to a loss condition 
(Bazerman and Moore 2009; Odean 1998; Slovic, Fishchoff, and Lichtenstein 1993).  
As a result, managers are less likely to sell a Level 3 fair value asset (liability) with a 
high (low) valuation since they would rather hold the inflated security on their balance sheet. 
However, if the asset (liability) uses a more conservative fair valuation, then managers should 
not have an incentive to keep the less conservative asset or liability on the financial statements. 
Based on the preceding arguments the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Manager’s willingness to sell Level 3 fair value securities is greater when 
more conservative assumptions are used than when less conservative 
assumptions are used for valuation. 
 
When managers are offered a selling price that when compared to the recognized fair 
value is a loss, managers should be disinclined to accept offers to sell a Level 3 fair value asset 
or liability. Motivated reasoning, as stated earlier, is the behavioral tendency that individuals 
tend to distort information in a manner that supports their desired outcome (Kunda 1990). In a 
setting in which managers are knowledgeable about whether the fair value recognized is more or 
less conservative, managers tend to believe that the value selected to accurately portray the 
“true” underlying value of the asset or liability.  
Prospect theory posits that individuals are more likely to be risk averse to gains than 
losses. In particular, Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 287) find that when “a person who has not 
made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him 
otherwise.” Thus, in a setting in which managers are conisdering selling a Level 3 fair value 
asset or liablity, prospect theory suggests that managers should desire to retain an asset or 
liability if that transaction generates a realized loss. In a scenario in which the manager can 
obtain a realized gain from the sale, they are induced to sell the asset or liability. For example, a 
manager purchases an available-for-sale security for $100 and fair value accounting adjusted the 
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carrying value to $120. If the manager sold the security for $110, there would be a $10 ($110-
100) realized gain on the income statement. However, as stated earlier, motivated reasoning 
argues that the manager is likely to believe that fair value is an accurate representation of the 
underlying value of the security because of the gain. Therefore, they are likely to set their 
expectation, or reference point, to $120. In addition, prospect theory contends that because the 
manager increased his or her reference point or expectation of the value of the security to $120, 
they should view offers below $120 as a loss. Thus, prospect theory predicts that the manager 
will not accept the offer despite a potential realized gain.  
Although prospect theory suggests that managers will avoid a loss, motivated reasoning 
contends that managers’ perspective of whether a loss or gain is present hinges on managers’ 
ability to rationalize whether the information is valid. Kunda (1990) states that motivated 
reasoning causes individuals to arrive at the conclusion they desire depending on their ability to 
justify their conclusion (Kunda 1990). Further, as stated earlier, Mishra et al (2013) contend that 
individuals will alter the information available in order to rationalize their sought-after outcome. 
In this context, managers are expected to distort whether the fair value represents the underlying 
value of the Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities in order to justify their decisions.  
Grounded in motivated reasoning theory, when confronted with an option to sell at a 
lower price than the conservative recognized fair value, managers will alter the information 
provided (whether the conservative level of the discretion used represents the value of the 
security) ,in order to justify their actions (to sell or to not sell below fair value). When the 
assumptions used are more conservative, managers are less likely to sell below the fair value 
because they are aware that the valuation method employed yields a conservative fair value. 
Managers will not perceive the recognized fair value as an accurate representation of the 
underlying security, and prospect theory argues that managers will view this transaction as a loss. 
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Therefore, when more conservative discretion is used to arrive at the fair value, managers will be 
less probable to accept an offer below the recognized fair value than if less conservative 
discretion is used. However, as the conservativism level decreases, managers’ willingness to 
accept a price below fair value increases because of managers’ inability to rationalize that the 
least conservative fair value is accurate. Thus, managers are mindful that the fair value of the 
Level 3 security is at the “high” end and therefore, is likely not to result in a perceived loss 
scenario.   
To summarize, managers are likely to use the most recent recognized fair value as their 
reference point when selling an asset or liability with a Level 3 fair value, pending they can 
rationalize that fair value represents the underlying value. Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) coupled with motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1990) predicts that managers 
are unlikely to sell the Level 3 fair value security below the recognized fair value if the security 
is valued more conservatively, and more likely to sell if valued less conservatively in order to 
avoid perceived losses. Therefore, based on prior arguments, the following is hypothesized: 
H3: Managers are more likely to accept an offer below the recognized fair value 
when less conservative discretion is used than when more conservative discretion is 
used.  
 
Volatility 
The inputs used to determine the recognized fair value of assets and liabilities may result 
in having historically low or high volatility patterns. Prior literature has shown that fair value 
securities can have historical volatility (Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen 1995). However, 
managers can use different assumptions in the valuation models to change the historical volatility 
pattern. These assumptions include adjusting the asset life or risk rate of return (Zyla 2013), or 
using of different fair value income methods (Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen 2006). 
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The discretion allowed for determining the inputs to calculate the recognized fair value 
can create low or high volatility of the historic pattern of recognized fair values. Nevertheless, 
not all volatility is completely controllable at the discretion of management. Some valuation 
model functions may include factors that are not subject to manager discretion, such as the risk 
free rate, or limited reasonable values, such as a limited asset lifespan (Zyla 2013). 
When developing the Level 3 fair valuation model, assumptions that use shorter life 
spans can create greater volatility by influencing the risk rate (Zyla 2013). Conversely, if 
managers were to increase the asset life in the fair valuation model, then they can decrease the 
volatility associated with those assets and liabilities. This means that whether managers adjust 
the life span of the security or directly change the risk rate, they have discretion to influence the 
volatility of the Level 3 fair value. Because Level 3 fair value securities are revalued when 
trading of other fair value investments occurs in the firm (Milbradt 2012), the number of 
revaluations is the same regardless of the volatility level. However, greater volatility may result 
in recognized fair values that are higher or lower than if the security has low volatility. Thus, the 
number of adjustments of the historical fair value will be similar among Level 3 fair value 
securities regardless of volatility level.   
Typically, firms hold trading securities for three months or less although available-for-
sale securities can be held for an indefinite number of years (Kieso et al 2013). Assets and 
liabilities that are Level 3 fair values are typically illiquid (Plantin et al. 2008) and because there 
is no active market for these assets, they can range from short-lived investment to an indefinite 
life investment. If the manager selects a longer asset-life span, they can decrease the historical 
volatility pattern of the asset or liability (Zyla 2013). Therefore, based on assumptions used in 
the fair valuation model, managers can decrease or increase the volatility pattern of the 
recognized fair value of the assets and liabilities.  
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High and Low Volatility  
When discretion leads to a high volatility pattern of the recognized assets and/or 
liabilities, managers’ risk perceptions and decisions are affected. As documented by prior 
research, high volatility can lead to increased risk perceptions (Bourgeois 1985) and, in turn, 
these risk perceptions affect investment decisions, such as retaining or selling an investment 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994). As volatility increases, so should uncertainty affecting accountants’ 
decision-making (March 1987). Conversely, assets and liabilities with low volatility fair value 
patterns are likely to lead to less uncertainty and decrease risk perceptions in the decision-
making process. 
In an experiment, Chan, Tan, and Wang (2012) examine the effects fair value accounting 
has on managers’ hedging decisions. They find that managers tend to be averse to report volatile 
earnings, preferring to report relatively stable or consistent earnings. Furthermore, in a survey of 
over 400 financial executives, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) provide support for the 
notion that managers have incentives to smooth earnings and forgo economic opportunities. 
They find evidence that managers believe that “reporting volatile earnings reduces the 
predictability of earnings, which in turn reduces stock prices because investors and analysts 
dislike uncertainty” (Rajgopal 2005: 1). These studies suggest that investors prefer stable 
earnings. Thus, managers have incentives to provide smooth earnings information, such using 
consistent fair values generating smooth unrealized gains on the income statement or the other 
comprehensive income statement.  
Plantin et al. (2008) suggest that fair valuation creates a bias in managerial decision-
making. They indicate that, due to fair value volatility, the fair value measure does not reflect the 
underlying economic value of the asset or liability. Plantin et al. (2008) develop a model 
suggesting that when employing fair value accounting in an illiquid market, firms can generate 
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artificial volatility that can lead to inefficient sales during financial downturns. As discussed 
previously, prospect theory argues that individuals are less averse to risk in loss settings than in 
gain settings (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In other words, in order to protect the unrealized 
gains generated from fair value adjustments, managers tend to be risk averse when making 
selling decisions.  
Further, traditional agency theory uses the underlying human behavior assumption that 
the managers tend to be risk averse, and that managers and shareholder may have different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is based on the premise that principals and agents 
can have opposing objectives unless the agent, or manager, has incentives to act in a manner that 
is congruent with the principal or shareholder objectives. Numerous studies find evidence that 
managers are risk averse unless incentivized to be otherwise (e.g., Brink, Jobson, Douglas 2011; 
Gomely, Matsa, and Milbourn 2013; Rego and Wilson 2012; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Further, through surveys, March and Shapira (1987) find that managers are risk averse in nature. 
In particular, they support the view that managers will “look for alternatives that can be managed 
to meet targets, rather than assess or accept risks” (March and Shapira, 1987: 1414). When the 
recognized fair value exceeds the historic cost, the firm should have an unrealized gain 
associated with the valuation. Therefore, because of the gain context, managers are likely to be 
risk averse when making selling decisions of fair value assets and liabilities.  
In a setting with highly volatile fair value patterns, managers tend to be more risk averse 
than in a setting in which the recognized fair value pattern is consistent or has low volatility. The 
greater uncertainty associated with high volatility patterns should create a desire to sell the Level 
3 fair value asset or liability to avoid potential risk. However, when the Level 3 fair value of 
assets and liabilities has a low volatility pattern of recognized fair values, managers do not have 
the same motivation to sell. With a decreased risk perception, managers are not inclined to sell as 
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quickly. Therefore, in low volatility fair value settings, managers can be expected to have a 
higher asking price than the most recent recognized fair value.  
In summary, because managers have discretion regarding the assumptions of inputs used 
in the valuation model, they can influence the historical volatility pattern of the recognized fair 
value. Managers can create relatively stable or volatile patterns of recognized fair valuation by 
changing assumptions regarding the life span of the asset or the risk rate of return. Increased 
volatility creates uncertainty in future fair values, and using prospect and agency theoretical 
views,
5
 risk averse managers should not want to retain these assets and liabilities. Conversely, 
assets and liabilities that have historically consistent fair values have a lower risk of the future 
recognized fair value significantly changing. Thus, based on the prior arguments, this leads to the 
next hypothesis: 
H4a: When Level 3 securities have high volatility, managers’ asking price 
will decrease from the most recent recognized fair value. 
 
 
H4b: When Level 3 securities have low volatility, managers’ asking price will 
increase from the most recent recognized fair value. 
  
                                                          
5
 Another complementary theory is the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). This theory 
argues that individuals develop systematic judgment that creates a correlation between past information and future 
decisions based on the consistency of the past information. The theory of representativeness heuristic is defined as 
“the more consistent the input, the more representative the predicted score will appear and the greater confidence in 
that prediction” (Kahneman and Tversky 1973:249).  
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III. METHOD 
 
Design and Participants 
This study is a 2X2 between-subjects design manipulating the level of fair value 
adjustment (whether more or less conservative) and the historical volatility pattern (low or high) 
with Level 3 securities in the firm. The primary dependent variables are (1) the participant’s 
likelihood of selling the Level 3 fair value security and (2) if they were to sell the security, what 
is the participant’s asking price. Graduate students were recruited from a mid-Atlantic university  
and Accounting professionals were recruited from the Qualtrics Panel to take part in this study. 
Prior literature indicates that graduate students can be valid surrogates for professionals in 
studies where the integration of information is not overly complex (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and 
Pronk 2007). In addition, Ashton and Kramer (1980) contend that both students and 
professionals, as decision-makers, possess the same biases. Tests are ran to determine if student 
responses differ significantly from professional responses. Participants are randomly assigned to 
one of the four treatments.   
Tasks and Procedures 
Participants were asked to place themselves in a hypothetical situation in which they 
were a manager of a financial services firm. They purchased a pool of Level 3 fair value 
available-for-sale securities. After a brief review of the accounting effects valuation has on these 
securities, the participants were told that the securities are valued either more or less 
conservatively. In addition, the valuation affects the volatility of the securities. After six quarters, 
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their firm is considering an investment in a venture that requires a large sum of cash and they can 
sell the Level 3 fair value securities to contribute the investment. Based on these circumstances, 
participants had to make selling decisions of the pool of securities. 
Figure 1: Scenario Time Line 
 
 
 
Participants responded to four questions (dependent variables), two manipulation check 
items, and debriefing items followed by demographic questions. The instrument took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete. The professionals were contacted through the Qualtrics 
Panel, a research marketing company that uses web-based surveys while graduate students were 
contacted in class and received a hard-copy survey.  
The instrument was pilot tested numerous times with undergraduate students. During the 
pilot tests, students were asked follow-up questions to identify areas that required modification. 
To establish face validity, a fair valuation expert provided guidance on this study. In addition, an 
expert specializing in complex fair valuations from a Big 4 accounting firm, critiqued the 
instrument and provided advice in order to keep the hypothetical scenario is in compliance with 
ASC 820 guidance.   
Bought securities 
Six fair value 
adjustments 
Consider selling 
Time from purchase to considering selling is six quarters 
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables are the levels of the valuation and volatility. The level of 
valuation is manipulated at two levels, whether the firm recognizes fair values that are more or 
less conservative. Participants assigned to the high valuation treatment were informed that the 
pool of Level 3 securities they originally purchased for $10 million, after six quarters has a fair 
value of $16 million. Conversely, participants assigned in the conservative treatment are 
informed that the Level 3 securities have a fair value of $13 million after six quarters.
6
 To avoid 
confounding effects caused from the sunk cost fallacy (Heath 1995), only fair values that 
generate unrealized gains over the historic cost of the security were selected. 
The second independent variable, historical volatility, is manipulated at two levels (low 
or high). A graph and table was provided to the participants to highlight the volatility of the pool 
of securities purchased (instruments are posted in Appendix A). The graphs illustrated the 
valuation changes during the six quarters. The tables provided the re-valuation of the pool of 
securities during each quarter along with the unrealized gains and losses that are reported on the 
other comprehensive income statement. 
Participants assigned to the high volatility treatment were informed that historically the 
firm has high volatility of the recognized Level 3 fair values. In addition, they were told that the 
market value of these securities changes frequently, and if this pattern persists in the future then 
the valuation is likely to change. Conversely, participants assigned to the low volatility treatment 
were informed that the firm historically has low volatility of Level 3 securities. The valuation 
pattern of the low volatility treatment is similar to that of the high volatility treatment with the 
                                                          
6 These dollar amounts were selected based on the pilot test and follow-up discussions with undergraduate students. 
The pilot test started with $11 million for the conservative treatment but students indicated that they did not notice 
the fair value increase from the historic cost. Other modifications were made after the pilot testing, including 
changing the period from five quarters to six in order to increase volatility on the graph. In addition, the most recent 
unrealized fair value for the non-conservative treatment was increased to $16 million in order to create more 
variance between the treatments. 
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exception that the variance between the highest and lowest recognized fair value is smaller,  
thereby providing an expectation that the pattern was likely to continue. 
Dependent Variables 
Participants were asked to decide whether to sell the pool of securities to release cash in 
order to contribute for a large company project. Multiple dependent variables were used in order 
to test all of the hypotheses. The first dependent variable assesses the likelihood of selling the 
pool securities. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 0% likelihood of selling to 100% 
likelihood of selling. This dependent variable was included to test hypothesis two, whether more 
or less conservative recognized fair value estimates influence manager’s willingness to sell the 
security.  
Assuming that they decided to sell the pool of securities they purchased six quarters ago, 
the second dependent variable asked participants to provide an asking price. Participants selected 
this asking price from a range of values from $9.5 million to $18 million. This range was 
selected because participants can select a value below the historic cost and values greater than 
the most recent recognized fair value. Asking price is included in the instrument in order to test 
the first hypothesis that less conservative recognized fair value estimates will result in higher 
asking prices and more conservative recognized fair value estimates will result in lower asking 
prices. In addition, hypothesis four can be tested using this dependent variable to determine 
whether low or high volatility affects the selected asking price.  
The third dependent variable requested participants to indicate the lowest price they 
would accept within the $9.5 million to $18 million range. This was included in the instrument to 
verify that participants are using cognitive resources when responding to the questions. If 
participants cannot identify a greater asking price than the lowest price they are willing to accept, 
then there is reasonable doubt that they did not understand the questions asked. 
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Finally, to test hypothesis three, participants were asked to assume that the market offers 
a price lower than the most recent fair valuation (an offer of $12 million if in the more 
conservative treatment or an offer of $15 million if the in the less conservative treatment), and 
assess the likelihood they would accept the offer. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 
a 0% to 100% likelihood of selling. Because the security in question is an available-for-sale 
security, the realized gain or loss is the difference between the historic cost and the selling price. 
The unrealized gains and losses associated with fair value adjustments were reflected in the other 
comprehensive income statement until sold. At that time, the unrealized gains and losses are 
reversed. This item was included to determine participants’ willingness to accept a selling price 
that is both below the recognized fair value and above the historic cost. 
Post-Experiment Items 
Following  the measurement of the dependent variable measures, participants were asked 
to respond to post-experimental questions including manipulation check questions, debriefing 
questions, and demographic questions. The purpose of these items was to indicate influential 
factors of participants’ selection of dependent variable items. 
Manipulation Checks  
The instrument contained two manipulation check questions that requested participants to 
indicate which Level 3 security valuation method were present in the firm. These items are 
included in the instrument to ensure that participants understood the manipulation when 
assessing the dependent variable items. The first question asked whether the hypothetical 
security used more or less conservative assumptions to arrive at the fair value. This question was 
intended to verify that participants were aware that the firm uses valuation discretion associated 
with Level 3 fair value. The second manipulation check question asked participants to indicate 
whether the assumptions used to determine valuation result in high or low volatility. This 
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question indicates whether participants were aware of the level of volatility associated with the 
firm’s valuation method and the pool of securities. Participants who failed any of the 
manipulation check questions were excluded in the analysis.  
Debriefing questions 
Debriefing questions were included in the instrument in order to provide an 
understanding of the likely causes of participants reporting choices. First, participants were 
required to evaluate the degree of importance various aspects of the instrument had on their 
selling choices. They were asked to assess the level of importance of each of the following: the 
policy to use more or less conservative fair value, the historic pattern of low or high volatility, 
the historic cost of the pool of securities, the accounting effect of fair value adjustments, and the 
discretion related to whether or not to sell the pool of securities. These items are used in 
ANOVA models to help identify which valuation features influenced the association between 
dependent and independent variables. 
Sitikin and Pablo (1992) find that risk mediates the effect on decision-making. This study 
used prospect theory to assume that managers are risk averse. To confirm this assumption, 
analyses will be performed to test whether risk mediates the association between dependent and 
independent variables using Sobel’s (1982) mediation tests. Further, to avoid potential estimation 
errors from OLS assumptions, normality and homoscedasticity, which are necessary for Sobel’s 
mediation tests, confidence interval bootstrapping will be performed to test for mediation (Hayes 
2015). If risk mediates the association, then this measure will be included in the hypothesis 
testing models.  
Risk aversion level was assessed using Holt and Laury’s (2002) risk aversion measure. 
Participants were asked to choose to play a lottery. There are ten lotteries with two options in 
each lottery. As the participants progresses through the ten lotteries, the probability of payout 
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indicates more risk-taking behavior is present when Option B is selected and more risk-averse 
behavior is present when Option A is selected. Option A is coded 0 and Option B is coded 1. 
These scores are summed and provide an overall risk score. Participants can have a score 
between 0 (more risk averse) and 10 (more risk-taking). The risk score for graduate students has 
a Cronbach’s α of 0.800, the risk score for the professionals has a Cronbach’s α of 0.803. These 
results indicate that the risk measure is reliable at conventional levels. 
Lastly, optimism and pessimism could influence decision-making (Isen and Patrick, 
1983). Therefore, the Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R) questionnaire, a validated 
optimism and pessimism measure, is included in the instrument (Scheier, Carver, and Bridges 
1994). The LOT-R measure contains three items for optimism, three items for pessimism, four-
filler items. The three pessimism items are reverse coded so that the higher score indicates 
greater optimism and lower score indicates greater pessimism. 
7
 
This study will test whether optimism influences decision-making by first examining 
bivariate correlations and then testing for mediation. If optimism is highly correlated with the 
dependent variables or is a mediator according to the Sobel test (1982) and Hayes (2015) 
PROCESS method that examines the confidence interval with bootstrapping the standard errors, 
then optimism will be included in the models for hypotheses tests. The optimism score of 
graduate students has a Cronbach’s α of .731. The optimism score of accounting professionals 
has a Cronbach’s α of .859. Finally, the optimism score of the combined sample has a 
Cronbach’s α of .740. These results indicate that the optimism measure is reliable at 
conventional levels, higher than the .63 as reported in Scheier et al (1994). 
Demographic items 
                                                          
7
 This study is not comparting the difference between optimism affirmation and pessimism disaffirmation. Thus, 
parsing the items into optimism and pessimism is not performed in this study (Scheier et al. 1994). 
 
 
37 
 
The last section of the instrument consisted of demographic items. Items included were 
the number of years of experience with fair value accounting, whether participants received 
training in fair value accounting, the number of years of professional experience, current job 
title, age, and gender. To verify that  randomization occurred among the four treatment groups, a 
MANOVA was estimated (Kerlinger and Lee 2000) that included demographic variables as 
dependent variables and the level of fair valuation (more or less) conservative and volatility (low 
or high) as independent variables. This will test for variance differences within groups. In 
addition, to test for potential co-variation among demographic variables, the correlations among 
the demographic, dependent, and independent variables will be examined. The presence of 
moderate to high levels of correlations will result in including these demographic variables as 
covariates in the analyses.  
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IV. RESULTS 
 
 
Sample  
A sample consisting of was collected that consists of business school graduate students 
recruited from a Mid-Atlantic university. In addition, a second sample consisting of accounting 
professionals was obtained through the Qualtrics Panel. For the purpose of this study, the 
Qualtrics Panel contacted participants who met the criteria of possessing both fair value 
accounting and accounting management experience. To safeguard that participants have task-
specific knowledge, they were screened to ensure that they have fair value accounting 
experience, and that they have at least two years of accounting management experience.  
Graduate Students 
Of the 143 graduate students who participated in this study, 17 (11.9%) failed the 
manipulation check questions and one (0.7%) had an initial asking price lower than the lowest 
price willing to accept. This resulted in 125 (87.4%) useable graduate student responses. Of the 
useable graduate student data, only four graduate students have experience with fair value 
accounting (3.2%). Of the useable graduate student sample, the average age is 28.59 years old 
and 31.25% are female. See Table 1, Panels A and B.  
To determine whether randomization occurred among the different treatments, the 
conservative level of the pool of securities (CONS) and the historical volatility (VOL) are used 
as independent variables in a MANOVA model. The demographic variables: age and gender are 
included as dependent variables. Neither conservative level, CONS (p = .726) nor volatility, 
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VOL (p = .412) are significant. In addition, t-tests that compare age and gender within the 
treatments of CONS and VOL are estimated to investigate whether randomization occurred. The 
t-tests for gender and age comparison for within the CONS treatments (p = .960 and .821, 
respectively) and within the VOL treatments (p = .403 and .116, respectively) are not significant. 
Therefore, these results provide reasonable assurance that randomization exists in the graduate 
student sample.  
TABLE 1 
Graduate Student Demographics 
 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations of Graduate Student Responses 
Variable n Mean SD 
Age 116 28.59 5.97 
Work Experience (in years) 100 6.01 4.59 
 
Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages of Graduate Students 
Variable Response n Percent 
Gender Male 77 68.75% 
 Female 35 31.25% 
Total responses  to gender question 112  
   
Age    
 20-24 22 17.60% 
 25-29 57 45.60% 
 30-34 32 25.60% 
 35-39 9 7.20% 
 40 +  5 4.00% 
Total responses to age question 125  
 
Accounting Professionals Sample 
Of the 741 accounting professionals who began the survey, 287 did not pass the 
accounting management and fair value accounting experience criteria, and 104 elected not to 
complete the survey after opening the link to the study (See Table 2). Of the professionals who 
chose to continue, 82 failed the manipulation check questions and 14 did not select an asking 
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price that was higher than the lowest price they would accept. Thus, a total of 73 responses will 
be used in the analyses.
8
   
 
TABLE 2 
Professional Accountant Sample 
Number of participants who began the survey 744 
Lack accounting experience (291) 
Lack fair value experience (168) 
Not in accounting (2) 
Failed manipulation checks (82) 
Failed to indicate a higher asking price than the lowest value willing to accept
9
 (14) 
Stopped at invitation page (91) 
Stopped at scenario (13) 
Serious omission (did not respond to any DV) (10) 
Total useable responses 73 
 
The accounting professional sample is 49.3% female and 50.7% male with an average 
age of 42.79 years (Table 3, Panels A and B). The professionals also have an average of 8.3 
years of fair value accounting experience. Of the useable professional sample, 15.07% are 
employed in a firm that has less than $1 million in annual revenues; 39.73% are employed in 
firms that have between $1 and $10 million; 21.96% employed  between $10 and $100 million; 
9.59% between $100 and $500 million; 16% between $500 million and $1 billion in annual 
revenue. 
To determine whether randomization occurred among the different treatments, the 
conservative level of the pool of securities (CONS) and the historical volatility (VOL) are used 
as independent variables in a MANOVA model. The demographic variables, age and gender are 
included as dependent variables. Neither the historical volatility, VOL (p = 0.926) nor 
                                                          
8
 When respondents fail manipulation check questions, Qualtrics Panel terminates the survey. Therefore, no data is 
available for participants who failed screen questions or manipulation check questions. 
9
Participants are asked to indicate an asking price if they were to sell in addition to the lowest they would accept. If 
the asking price is not greater than the lowest price they would accept, than they did not use cognitive resources 
when responding to questions. Therefore, these responses are excluded from analysis. 
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conservative level, CONS are significant (p = 0.137). Also, the t-tests show that age is not 
significantly different between non-conservative fair value treatments (Large CONS) and 
conservative fair value (Small CONS) treatments (p =  0.328). Further, age and gender are not 
significantly different between treatments with high and low volatility (p = 0.789 and 0.569 
respectively). However, a moderate difference in gender exists between the conservative 
treatments (p = 0.082). This is likely due to the sample having more males (20) than females (13) 
in the non-conservative treatment, and less males (16) than females (24) in the conservative 
treatment. Examining the correlation table (Table 4), gender has a low-level correlation with 
both dependent and independent variables. Therefore, the different gender ratios between the 
treatments are not expected to influence the analysis.   
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TABLE 3 
Professional Accountant Demographics 
 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations of Professional Responses 
Variable n Mean SD 
Age 73 42.79 8.88 
Fair value Experience (in years) 73 8.30 6.83 
 
Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages of Professional Accountant Demographics 
Variable Response n Percent 
Gender Male 36 49.3% 
 Female 37 50.7% 
Total responses to gender question 73  
   
Age    
 20-24 0   0.00% 
 25-29 3  4.11% 
 30-34 11 15.07% 
 35-39 16 21.92% 
 40-44 15 20.55% 
 45-49 12 16.44% 
 50-54 7 9.59% 
 55 +  9 12.33% 
Total responses to age question 73  
 
 Low to moderate levels of correlation exist between dependent and independent 
variables. The dependent variables consist participants likelihood to sell the security (SELL), 
asking price if they were to sell (ASK), the lowest price they would accept if they were to sell 
(LOW), and the likelihood they would accept a price lower than the fair value (LO_FV). The 
correlation table provided on Table 4, Panel A indicates that in the graduate students’ dependent 
variable, conservative level is highly correlated with asking price (r =.703, p < 0.01). Also, 
graduate students have a moderate correlation level between the conservative level and the 
lowest price willing to accept (r = .386, p < 0.01) and the likelihood of accepting a value below 
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the fair value (r =.300, p < 0.01). Further, volatility is moderately correlated with selling 
likelihood (r =.352, p < 0.01), and has a low correlation with the lowest price willing to accept (r 
= -.257, p < 0.01) and the likelihood of accepting an offer less than fair value (r =.148 p = 
0.099).  
The correlation provided on Table 4, Panel B, indicates that for accounting professionals, 
the independent variable CONS has low correlation with selling likelihood (r =.103, p = 0.386) 
and the lowest price willing to accept (r =.253, p = 0.031). The accounting professionals also 
have a moderate correlation between conservative level and the asking price (.313, p  < 0.01), 
and the likelihood to accept a price lower than the fair value (.405, p  < 0.01). The independent 
variable, volatility, has low correlations with asking price  (.215, p = 0.067), selling likelihood (r 
=.147, p = 0.215), lowest price willing to accept (r =.045, p = 0.071) and likelihood of accepting 
a value below fair value (-.094, p = 0.430). Further, gender and conservative level are correlated 
(-.205, p = 0.082).
10
  
                                                          
10
 Additional analysis are performed that include gender as covariate in the professional sample. This inclusion did 
not affect the output from the MANOVA and ANOVAs. Therefore, gender is not included in the models in the 
results section. The results are posted in Appendix B. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlations 
Panel A:  Graduate Students 
 CONS VOL SELL ASK LOW LO_FV GEN AGE OPT RISK 
CONS 1.000          
VOL .023 1.000         
SELL .037 .352*** 1.000        
ASK .703*** .009 -.031 1.000       
LOW .385*** -.257*** -.185** .476*** 1.000      
LO_FV .300*** .148* .287*** -.081 -.303*** 1.000     
GEN .005 .080 -.002 -.022 -.086 .122 1.000    
AGE -.021 -.149 -.145 -.102 .134 -.038 -.308*** 1.000   
OPT .034 -.120 -.092 -.064 -.027 -.010 -.117 .065 1.000  
RISK -.010 .067 -.028 .096 -.111 .054 -.113 .008 -.095 1.000 
 
 
Panel B: Professionals 
 CONS VOL SELL ASK LOW LO_FV GEN AGE OPT RISK 
CONS 1.000          
VOL .053 1.000         
SELL .103 .147 1.000        
ASK .313*** .215* .140 1.000       
LOW .253** .045 .005 .639*** 1.000      
LO_FV .405*** -.094 .215* -.044 -.229* 1.000     
GEN -.205* .041 .114 -.026 -.176 .022 1.000    
AGE -.116 -.038 .106 -.126 .020 -.046 .002 1.000   
OPT -.289** -.092 .148 -.151 -.051 -.089 -.057 .216* 1.000  
RISK -.038 .138 .127 .064 .026 -.201* -.006 -.007 0.128 1.000 
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Panel C: Combined Sample 
 CONS VOL SELL ASK LOW LO_FV GEN AGE OPT RISK 
CONS 1.000          
VOL .030 1.000         
SELL .064 .254*** 1.000        
ASK .534*** .094 .059 1.000       
LOW .336*** -.145** -.113 .537*** 1.000      
LO_FV .337*** .060 .256*** -.067 -.274*** 1.000     
GEN -.086 .075 .039 -.038 -.117 .091 1.000    
AGE -.068 -.030 -.046 -.133* .075 .021 .038 1.000   
OPT -.087 -.112 .008 -.097 -.038 -.043 -.102 .039 1.000  
RISK -.017 .092 .043 .087 -.059 -.055 -.081 -.067 .006 1.000 
 
 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
SELL: Likelihood of selling 
ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
LO_FV: Willingness to accept a price lower than the recognized fair value 
GEN: Gender: 0 if male; 1 if female 
AGE: Age 
OPT: Optimism measure 
RISK: Risk measure 
*, **, *** p < .10, .05, and .01, respectively 
 
 
T-tests are used to comparing graduate students’ and professionals’ responses test (see 
Table 5). The means for each of the dependent variables are not statistically different between 
the accounting professionals and graduate student sample. The smallest p-value from the t-test is 
0.328 (asking price) supporting that responses to the independent variable questions are 
significantly similar between professionals and graduate students. To compare professional and 
graduate students, both samples are used throughout the analysis. Further, because the dependent 
variables are not statistically different between professionals and graduate students, this study 
also includes the combined sample in the analysis. The useable graduates students responses, 
sample S, consists of 125 participants; professional responses, sample P, contains 73 
participants; and the combined responses, sample C, consists of 198 participants.  
TABLE 5 
Comparing Professionals and Graduate Students 
Variable Group n Mean SD 
T-test             
(p-value) 
SELL      
 Graduate Students 124 62.258 23.645 .668 
 Professionals 73 59.863 25.413 (.505) 
ASK      
 Graduate Students 124 15.161 1.495 .982 
 Professionals 73 14.922 1.893 (.328) 
LOW      
 Graduate Students 125 12.824 1.782 -.438 
 Professionals 73 12.938 1.770 (.662) 
LO_FV      
 Graduate Students 125 48.080 30.893 -.629 
 Professionals 73 50.960 31.365 (.530) 
GEN      
 Graduate Students 112 0.313 0.466 -2.687 
 Professionals 73 0.507 0.503 (< .01) 
AGE      
 Graduate Students 116 28.595 5.974 -13.142 
 Professionals 73 42.795 8.880 (< .01) 
SELL: Likelihood of selling 
ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
LO_FV: Willingness to accept a price lower than the recognized fair value 
GEN: Gender: 0 if male; 1 if female 
AGE: Age 
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An a-priori power analysis is estimated using the small, medium, and large effect sizes 
from Cohen (1992) in order to determine sample sizes that are necessary to detect the traditional 
effect sizes. These calculations are performed using G*Power software. In addition, empirical 
effect sizes .16 and .21 are used in the sample size calculations. These effect sizes are determined 
through a meta-analysis study (Bosco, Aguinis, Field, and Peirce 2015). Based on the results 
listed in Table 6 below, 61 participants are necessary to detect a medium effect size and 24 
participants are necessary to detect a large effect size for two-tailed tests. Both graduate student 
and professional samples are each large enough to detect a medium effect size.  
TABLE 6 
A Priori Power Analysis 
 Effect Size Power Sample size 
Small .10 .80 525 
Medium .30 .80 61 
Large .50 .80 24 
Average of all effect sizes in 
Meta 
.16 .80 207 
Average effect size for 
Performance studies 
.21 .80 122 
 
Dependent Variables  
As mentioned earlier, participants were asked to respond to four dependent variables: the 
likelihood they would sell the securities (SELL); the initial asking price they would sell the pool 
of securities if they were to sell (ASK); the lowest price they would accept if they were to sell 
(LOW); and the willingness they would accept a price lower than the most recognized fair value 
(LO_FV). The variables SELL and LO_FV have a range between 0% (not sell) and 100% 
(definitely sell). The variables ASK and LOW have a range between $9.5 million and $18 
million. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables for each dataset and treatment are 
reported in Table 7.  
 
 
48 
 
For graduate students, volatility increases the asking price ($14.30 million to $16.1 
million) and the likelihood of accepting a price below fair value (34.00% to 54.19%), while 
decreases the selling likelihood (55.29% to 54.33%) and the  lowest price willing to accept 
($12.74 million to $13.84 million) when the discretion used to arrive at the fair value is more 
conservative. However, when less conservative discretion is used, greater volatility decreases the 
likelihood of selling (54.33% to 72.00%), the asking price ($14.30 million to $13.97 million), the 
lowest price willing to accept ($12.74 million to $11.50 million), and the likelihood of accepting 
a price below the fair value (34.00% to 45.00%). When volatility is low, less conservative levels 
in fair value discretion increases graduate students’ asking price ($14.30 million to $16.1 
million) ,the lowest price willing to accept ($12.74 million to $13.84 million), and the likelihood 
of accepting a price lower than the fair value (34.00% to 54.19%), while decreasing the selling 
likelihood (55.29% to 54.33%). However, when volatility is present, as the conservative levels in 
fair value discretion decreases, the mean of all four dependent variables increases as indicated in 
Panel A of Table 7. 
For accounting professionals, greater volatility increases the likelihood to sell (from 
52.00% to 63.00%), the asking price ($13.55 million to $15.23 million), and lowest price willing 
to accept ($12.30 million to $12.78 million) when more conservative fair value assumptions are 
used (Small CONS treatment). However, the likelihood of accepting a value less than fair value 
decreases from 42.00% to 37.00%. When the conservative level used to arrive at the fair value 
decreases (Large CONS treatment), volatility increases the averages for lowest price willing to 
accept ($13.60 million to $12.28 million) and the likelihood to accept an offer below fair value 
(70.00% to 60.56%), but the likelihood to sell does not change. Comparing the discretion 
conservative level conditions, professionals have an increase in selling likelihood (52.00% to 
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63.89%), asking price ($13.55 million to $15.77 million), lowest price willing to accept ($12.30 
million to $13.60 million), and the likelihood to accept value below fair value (42.00% to 
70.00%) when volatility is low. However, when volatility increases, the likelihood to accept a 
value below fair value increases as the conservative level decreases (37.00% to 60.56%), but the 
other dependent variables remain consistent between the conservative levels. These 
dissimilarities among the treatment groups indicate that graduate students responded differently 
to the dependent variables than the professionals within each condition.  
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TABLE 7 
Means of Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Graduate Students 
 SMALL CONS: Conservative LARGE CONS: Non-Conservative 
LOW VOLATILITY: n = 34 n = 31 
SELL 55.29% 54.33% 
ASK $14.30 million $16.1 million 
LOW $12.74 million $13.84 million 
LO_FV 34.00% 54.19% 
   
HIGH VOLATILITY n = 30  n = 30 
SELL 68.00% 72.00% 
ASK $13.97 million $16.83 million 
LOW $11.50 million $13.20 million 
LO_FV 45.00% 61.00% 
Panel B: Professionals 
 SMALL CONS: Conservative LARGE CONS: Non-Conservative 
LOW VOLATILITY: n = 20 n = 15 
SELL 52.00% 63.89% 
ASK $13.55 million $15.77 million 
LOW $12.30 million $13.60 million 
LO_FV 42.00% 70.00% 
   
HIGH VOLATILITY n = 20 n = 18 
SELL 63.00% 63.89% 
ASK $15.23 million $15.41 million 
LOW $12.78 million $12.28 million 
LO_FV 37.00% 60.56% 
Panel C: Combined Sample 
 SMALL CONS: Conservative LARGE CONS: Non-Conservative 
LOW VOLATILITY: n = 54 n = 46 
SELL 54.07% 57.02% 
ASK $14.08 million $15.99 million 
LOW $12.57 million $13.85 million 
LO_FV 37.04% 57.29% 
   
HIGH VOLATILITY: n = 50 n = 58 
SELL 66.00% 68.96% 
ASK $14.47 million $16.02 million 
LOW $12.01 million $13.23 million 
LO_FV 41.60% 60.83% 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
SELL: Likelihood of selling 
ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
LO_FV: Likelihood of accepting a price below the recognized fair value 
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To determine whether the covariates, optimism and risk, are required in the model, the 
bivariate associations are examined from Table 4. The student sample has similar results as the 
professional sample. For graduate students, the correlations between optimism and selling 
likelihood (r = -.092, p = .705), asking price (r = -.064, p = .482), lowest price willing to accept 
(r = -.027, p = .763), and likelihood of accepting a price below fair value (r = -.010, p = .914) are 
low and insignificant. For accounting professionals, the correlations between optimism and 
selling likelihood (r = .148, p = .213), asking price (r = -.151, p = .202), lowest price willing to 
accept (r = -.051, p = .671), and likelihood of accepting a price below fair value (r = -.089, p = 
.455) are also low and insignificant. However, optimism has a significant correlation with the 
conservative level (r = -.289, p = .013) only in the accounting professional sample. 
Based on the low and statistically non-significant correlations reported on Table 4, 
optimism is not likely a covariate. Sobel tests are performed for each path between the 
independent and dependent variables to determine whether optimism mediates any associations. 
These tests are performed using an interactive calculation tool developed by Preacher and 
Leonardelli (2010). This interactive tool is based on mediating measures used in prior literature 
(Sobel 1982; Baron and Kenny, 1986, and Goodman 1960). Regressions are estimated using the 
potential mediator as the dependent variable and the independent variable (CONS or VOL) as the 
independent variable. A second model is estimated that regresses the independent variable and 
potential mediating variable on the dependent variable. The coefficients and standard errors from 
the two models are entered into the web-based tool to provide a test statistic and p-value.  
Sobel tests that lack significance indicate that the variable does not mediate the 
association between the independent and dependent variables identified in Model Tested column 
on Table 8. The optimism measure for the student, professional or combined samples do not 
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have any significant paths, the smallest p-values are .541, .179, and .334, respectively (Table 8, 
Panel A). 
Based on Eisenhardt’s (1989) agency theory, the hypotheses in this study assume that 
managers are risk averse. Nonetheless, Hoyt and Laury’s (2002) risk measure was used to 
determine whether risk mediates the association between the independent and dependent 
variables. Sobel tests are performed to determine whether risk mediates the association between 
the dependent and independent variables. The Sobel tests indicate that risk does not mediate the 
association between any independent variables and dependent variables (Table 8). The smallest 
p-value in the student sample has a p-value of .268, which is the association between the 
conservative level and the lowest price willing to accept. The professional sample has a smallest 
p-value of  0.341, which is the association between volatility and the likelihood of accepting an 
offer lower than the fair value.  
Sobel tests have been criticized for assuming normality and homoscedasticity (Hayes 
2015). Therefore, Hayes’ PROCESS analysis is used to determine whether mediation is present 
by bootstrapping the model that includes direct and indirect paths of the potential mediator to the 
dependent variable and then examining the confidence intervals (Preacher and Hayes 2004). 
These tests use the recommended 5000 replications in bootstrap mediation analyses (Bruin 
2006). Table 8 reports the confidence intervals and p-values for each indirect association. 
Significant indirect paths indicate that mediation is present. The results listed in Table 9 provide 
additional support that neither optimism nor risk mediate the association between the dependent 
and independent variables because the indirect confidence intervals are not significant in all three 
samples.  
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TABLE 8 
Sobel Test Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Optimism as Mediator 
Model Tested Graduate Students 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
Professionals 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
Combined 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
CONS → ASK -.366 (.714) .548 (.584) .684 (.494) 
CONS → SELL -.356 (.722) -1.345 (.179) -.186 (.852) 
CONS → LOW -.299 (.765) -.192 (.848) .130 (.896) 
CONS → LO_FV -.197 (.843) -.268 (.789) .204 (.839) 
VOL → ASK .610 (.541) .641 (.521) .965 (.334) 
VOL → SELL .568 (.570) -.677 (.498) -.049 (.624) 
VOL → LOW .560 (.549) .349 (.727) .693 (.489) 
VOL → LO_FV -.091 (.927) .565 (.572) .419 (.675) 
 
Panel B : Risk as Mediator 
Model Tested Graduate Students 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
Professionals 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
Combined 
Test Statistic (p-value) 
CONS → ASK -.111 (.912) -.287 (.774) -1.348 (.178) 
CONS → SELL .104 (.917) -.305 (.760) -.059 (.555) 
CONS → LOW 1.107 (.268) -.220 (.826) .756 (.449) 
CONS → LO_FV -.109 (.913) .312 (.755) .690 (.490) 
VOL → ASK .060 (.546) .284 (.776) .833 (.405) 
VOL → SELL -.437 (.662) .723 (.470) .298 (.766) 
VOL → LOW -.608 (.543) .134 (.870) -.568 (.570) 
VOL → LO_FV .415 (.678) -.952 (.341) -.700 (.484) 
 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
SELL: Likelihood of selling 
ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
LO_FV: Likelihood of accepting a price below the recognized fair value 
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TABLE 9 
Bootstrap Confidence Interval Tests for Mediation: Indirect Effects Reported 
Panel A:  Optimism as Mediator 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CONS → ASK -.084 .044 -.249 .377 -.035 .076 
CONS → SELL -1.165 1.290 -8.462 .983 -.904 .905 
CONS → LOW -.071 .058 -.371 .215 -.055 .061 
CONS → LO_FV -1.374 .946 -5.869 4.396 -.974 1.204 
VOL → ASK -.052 .122 -.104 .274 -.025 .121 
VOL → SELL -.886 1.970 -3.472 1.674 -1.242 .780 
VOL → LOW -.056 .154 -.123 .146 -.035 .106 
VOL → LO_FV -2.103 1.574 -2.269 3.631 -1.076 1.523 
Panel B: Optimism as Mediator: Testing for Mediated Moderator 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CONS*VOL → ASK -.104 .103 -.112 .440 -.073 .144 
CONS*VOL → SELL -.958 3.061 -7.570 1.061 -2.203 1.291 
CONS*VOL → LOW -.131 .156 -.222 .269 -.093 .127 
CONS*VOL → LO_FV -3.376 1.820 -3.678 6.309 -2.155 2.320 
Panel B : Risk as Mediator 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CONS → ASK -.101 .055 -.139 .094 -.080 .042 
CONS → SELL -1.11 .951 -3.051 1.458 -.835 .533 
CONS → LOW -.095 .108 -.153 .072 -.040 .050 
CONS → LO_FV -1.513 1.169 -2.390 4.349 -.719 .967 
VOL → ASK -.030 .145 -.092 .204 -.016 .119 
VOL → SELL -1.432 .851 -1.179 3.629 -.693 1.007 
VOL → LOW -.154 .043 -.139 .170 -.097 .038 
VOL → LO_FV -.741 2.209 -7.400 1.154 -1.771 .702 
Panel C: Risk as Mediator: Testing for Mediated Moderator 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CONS*VOL → ASK -.0474 .103 -.0921 .186 -.026 .092 
CONS*VOL → SELL -1.460 1.046 -1.482 3.606 -.634 1.116 
CONS*VOL → LOW -.176 .077 -.165 .120 -.121 .030 
CONS*VOL → LO_FV -1.034 2.120 -5.673 2.726 -1.580 .7882 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
CONS*VOL: indicates moderator for conservative and volatility 
SELL: Likelihood of selling 
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ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
LO_FV: Likelihood of accepting a price below the recognized fair value 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
In this study, the dependent variables, asking price (ASK) and the lowest amount willing 
to accept (LOW), have the same dollar amount scale ($9.5 million to $18 million), and the 
likelihood to sell (SELL) and the likelihood to accept an offer below the recognized fair value 
(LO_FV) have the same percentage scale (0% to 100%). When performing MANOVA, if the 
dependent variables were highly correlated with each other, then the results can be vulnerable to 
multicollinearity (Leech et al. 2011). Therefore, the dependent variables need to be moderately 
correlated with each other. According to Tybout et al. (2001), correlation levels should be 
approximately within 0.3 to 0.7 in order to be included in MANOVA. The asking price (ASK) 
and lowest price willing to accept (LOW) are moderately correlated for graduate students (r = 
.514), professionals (r = 0.639), and the combined sample (r = 0.564), and can be used together 
in the MANOVA. The correlation level for selling likelihood and the likelihood of accepting a 
value below the fair value is considerably low for professionals (r = 0.215) and for the combined 
sample (r = 0.267). The graduate student sample correlation is r = 0.314, slightly surpassing the r 
= 0.300 threshold established by Tybout et al. (2001). To keep the analysis consistent among the 
three samples, ANOVA’s are estimated for likelihood to sell (SELL) and the likelihood to accept 
an offer below the fair value (LO_FV) rather than a MANOVA. 
The first hypothesis states that Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities that use less 
conservative assumptions will cause managers to have a higher asking price if they were to sell 
the security than if the fair value measure used more conservative assumptions. Accounting 
professionals’ average for asking price (ASK) when more conservative assumptions are used is 
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$14.39 million while less conservative assumptions has an average of $15.57 million. Graduate 
students’ average asking price is $14.15 million for more conservative assumptions and $16.24 
million for less conservative assumptions, respectively. The combined sample yields an average 
asking price of $14.24 million and $16.00 million for more and less conservative assumptions, 
respectively. Hypothesis one is tested using a MANOVA with asking price and low price as 
dependent variables. The results reported in Table 10 support the contention that conservative 
assumptions (CONS) influence the asking price when selling Level 3 fair value securities. There 
is statistically significant difference in selling decisions based on the conservative assumptions 
for graduate students (p < .01, Wilks’ λ = .495), professionals (p < .01, Wilks’ λ = .884), and the 
combined sample (p < .01, Wilks’ λ = .709). 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 
Asking price Means and lowest price willing to accept Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) 
Panel A: Graduate Students Asking Price Means 
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL $14.30 million $16.10 million -6.417 *** 
High VOL $13.97 million $16.83 million -9.179 *** 
T-test 1.372 -.968  
Panel B: Graduate Students MANOVA 
Multivariate Univariate 
Effect Wilks’ λ df F-value Sig. 
ASK 
F-value 
LOW 
F-value 
Model .450 3 19.47 < .01 40.81*** 11.79*** 
CONS .495 1 60.80 < .01 120.71*** 24.33*** 
VOL .917 1 5.38 .058 .02 10.87*** 
CONS *VOL .974 1 1.56 .214 2.67 1.10 
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Panel C: Professionals Asking Price Means 
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL $14.30 million $16.10 million -.282 
High VOL $13.97 million $16.83 million -4.664 *** 
T-test -3.191 *** .578  
Panel D: Professionals MANOVA 
Multivariate Univariate 
Effect Wilks’ λ df F-value Sig. 
ASK 
F-value 
LOW 
F-value 
Model .768 3 3.19 < .01 6.14*** 1.94 
CONS .884 1 4.44 < .01 8.76*** 4.91** 
VOL .950 1 1.81 .172 2.63 .04 
CONS *VOL .910 1 3.36 .041 6.32** .96 
Panel E: Combined Sample Asking Price Means 
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL $14.30 million $16.10 million -7.867*** 
High VOL $13.97 million $16.83 million -4.956*** 
T-test -1.641 -.094  
Panel F: Combined Sample MANOVA 
Multivariate Univariate 
Effect Wilks’ λ df F-value Sig. 
ASK 
F-value 
LOW 
F-value 
Model .666 3 14.42 < .01 26.84*** 10.24*** 
CONS .709 1 39.74 < .01 77.04*** 25.99*** 
VOL .945 1 5.64 < .01 1.38 5.39** 
CONS *VOL .992 1 .82 .441 1.08 .00 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
ASK: Asking price 
LOW: Lowest price they would accept  
*, **, *** p < .10, .05, and .01, respectively 
 
 ANOVA tests are examined to determine whether one dependent variable was causing 
the outcomes in the MANOVA test. The results in Table 10 indicate that the conservative level 
discretion significantly influences asking price for graduate students (F-statistic=  120.71, p < 
.01), professionals (F-statistic= 8.76, p < .01), and the combined sample (F-statistic= 77.04, p < 
.01).  The ANOVA also indicates that the lowest price graduate students are willing to accept is 
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influenced by the conservative level (F-statistic= 24.33, p < .01) and the volatility level (F-
statistic= 10.87, p < .01). Professionals’ lowest price willing to accept is only influenced by the 
conservative level (F-statistic= 4.91, p = .030). 
11
 
Further, the results posted on Table 10 show an interaction exists in the professional 
sample between conservative level and volatility for asking price (F-statistic=  6.32, p < .01). 
The means of the asking price for professionals and graduate students are illustrated in Figure 2 
and 3, respectively. 
 
                                                          
11 Additional analysis are performed in the Supplemental Analysis section that examine the difference between the 
asking price and the recognized fair value to determine whether conservative level or the values influenced the 
asking price.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Professionals’ Average Asking 
Price 
 
 
Figure 3: Graduate Students’ 
 Average Asking Price 
 
The significant interaction suggests that greater volatility likely causes managers to 
believe that the fair value will change in the opposite direction, or mean reversion. Mean 
reversion (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998) is the phenomenon that individuals will expect 
that values that increase will eventually decrease. This means that managers are likely to view 
the more conservative fair valuation as a low value and consequently will expect the fair value to 
increase, thus resulting in managers to increase their asking price from the recognized fair value. 
However, mean reversion contends that if a value is high, then individuals will expect a decrease 
in value. Conversely, firms that have historically volatile Level 3 fair values along with less 
conservative fair valuation policies, mean reversion theory suggests that manager expectations of 
the Level 3 fair value should decrease. This creates an environment for managers’ to want to sell 
quickly, and therefore accept a lower price, before the fair valuation decrease occurs. 
The second hypothesis states that manager’s willingness to sell the Level 3 fair value 
securities is greater when more conservative assumptions are used than when less conservative 
assumptions are used. Graduate students are 63.71% likely to sell when less conservative 
assumptions are used, and 61.41 % likely to sell when more conservative assumptions are used. 
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Accounting professionals, on average, are 57.5% likely to sell when more conservative fair value 
discretion is used, and 62.73% likely to sell when less conservative discretion is used (Reported 
in Panel C, Table 11). 
The combined sample has an average selling likelihood of 59.90% when discretion 
arrives at more conservative valuations and 63.01% when discretion provides less conservative 
fair valuation. Thus, on average, participants are more likely to sell Level 3 fair value securities 
when less conservative discretion is used to arrive at the most recent fair value. The ANOVA 
estimates in Table 11 do not support the contention that the discretion conservative level (CONS) 
significantly influences the likelihood to sell the security (Graduate students F =.11, p = .740; 
Professionals F= .73, p = .394; and the combined sample F = .630, p = .429). Thus, these results 
fail to support the hypothesis two. This unexpected result is further investigated in the 
supplemental analysis section.  
TABLE 11 
Selling Likelihood (SELL) Means and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Panel A: Graduate Students Selling Likelihood Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL 55.29% 54.33% .165 
High VOL 68.00% 72.00% -.648 
T-test -2.331** -2.988***  
Panel B: Graduate Students ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 56.578 1 56.578 .11 .740 
VOL 7285.668 1 7285.668 14.27 <.01 
CONS*VOL 165.466 1 165.466 .32 .570 
Error 61280.392 120 510.670   
Panel C: Professional Selling Likelihood Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL 55.29% 54.33% -.964 
High VOL 68.00% 72.00% -.122 
T-test -1.292 -.310  
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Panel D: Professionals ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 470.222 1 470.222 .73 .394 
VOL 826.889 1 826.889 1.28 .263 
CONS*VOL 320.889 1 320.889 .49 .481 
Error 44741.11 69 648.422   
Panel E: Combined Sample Selling Likelihood Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) T-test 
Low VOL 55.29% 54.33% -.051 
High VOL 68.00% 72.00% -.615 
T-test -2.572*** -2.557***  
Panel F: Combined Sample ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 351.000 1 351.000 .63 .429 
VOL 7308.925 1 7308.925 13.03 <.01 
CONS*VOL .337 1 .337 .00 .980 
Error 107729.62 193 558.185   
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
*, **, *** p < .10, .05, and .01, respectively 
 
Hypothesis three states that managers are more likely to accept an offer below the 
recognized fair value when less conservative discretion is used than when more conservative 
discretion is used. Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood they would sell the security on 
scale of 0% (will not sell) to 100% (will sell). The means, reported in Panel A of Table 12, show 
that when less conservative discretion is used, professionals are more likely to accept a price 
below fair value (67.85%) than when more conservative discretion is used (39.50%). Further, 
graduate students and the combined the sample are more likely to accept a price below fair value 
when less conservative fair values are used (57.54% and 60.11%, respectively) than when more 
conservative fair values are used (39.06%, 57.54%, respectively).  
ANOVAs are estimated using the likelihood of accepting an offer below fair value as the 
dependent variable and the conservative discretion level and volatility as the independent 
 
 
62 
 
variables. The results in Panel B, C, and D in Table 12 show that conservative discretion level 
significantly influences the likelihood to sell below fair value ( p<.01 in all three samples). 
Providing support for hypothesis three that as conservativism decreases, the likelihood to accept 
an offer below fair value increases.  
TABLE 12 
Likelihood to Sell below the Recognized Fair Value 
Panel A: Average Likelihood to Sell below Recognized Fair Value 
 More 
Conservative 
Less 
Conservative t-test 
Two-Tailed p-
value 
Students 39.06% 57.54% -3.490 <.01 
Professionals 39.50% 64.85% -3.732 <.01 
Combined 39.23% 60.11% -5.001 <.01 
Panel B: Graduate Students ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 10329.3483 1 10329.3483 11.77 <.01 
VOL 2347.0516 1 2347.0516 2.70 .103 
CONS*VOL 109.141 1 109.141 .13 .724 
Error 105195.035 121 869.380   
Panel C: Professionals ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 11960.889 1 11960.889 14.17 <.01 
VOL 938.889 1 938.889 1.11 .295 
CONS*VOL 88.889 1 88.889 .11 .747 
Error 58324.444 69 843.977   
Panel D: Combined Sample ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 21283.645 1 21283.675 24.66 <.01 
VOL 451.147 1 451.147 .52 .471 
CONS*VOL 116.791 1 116.791 .14 .713 
Error 167445.027 194 863.119   
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
Logistic regressions are estimated to examine how the conservative level of discretion 
used to determine the Level 3 fair value securities influences the selling likelihood when an offer 
is below the recognized fair value (Panel A, B, and C of Table 13) . The dependent variable is 
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the dichotomized likelihood of selling below fair value. The variable is coded 0 if the likelihood 
to sell is less than 50%, and coded 1 if the greater than 50%. Responses that are equal to 50% are 
not included in the analysis. The model using the professional sample indicates that the 
dependent variables, conservative level (CONS) and volatility (VOL) significantly predict 
whether or the participant would sell the Level 3 fair value security at a price below fair value (χ2 
= 16.972, df = 3, p < .01). Consistent with hypothesis 3, the main effect for conservative level is  
positive and significant (p = .013).This suggests that as the conservative level decreases, the odds 
of selling Level 3 fair value securities below the recognized fair value increases by 18.333 times. 
The model using the graduate student sample (χ2 = 9.921, df = 3, p = .019) and the combined 
sample (χ2 = 18.214, df = 3, p < 0.01) are also significant with a positive and significant main 
effect for the conservative level (p = .050, and < .01, respectively), consistent with hypothesis 3. 
These results indicate that the odds of graduate students and the combined sample selling Level 3 
fair value securities below the recognized fair value, increases 3.143 and 4.170 times, 
respectively, as conservativism decreases. 
TABLE 13 
Logistic regression using sell under the lowest fair value as the dependent variable 
 
Panel A: Graduate Students Logistic Regression 
Source B SE Odds Ratio 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 1.145 .585 3.143 .050 
VOL 1.071 .580 2.918 .065 
CONS*VOL -.483 .804 .617 .548 
Constant -1.145 .434 .318 .008 
 
Panel B: Professionals Logistic Regression 
Source B SE Odds Ratio 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 2.909 1.165 18.333 .013 
VOL -.349 .731 .705 .633 
CONS*VOL -.942 1.405 .390 .503 
Constant -.606 .508 .545 .232 
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Panel C: Combined Sample Logistic Regression 
Source B SE Odds Ratio 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 1.428 .471 4.170 <.01 
VOL .526 .447 1.692 .239 
CONS*VOL -.294 .649 .745 .650 
Constant -.932 .327 .394 .004 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
 
 
The last hypothesis argues that (A) greater volatility will result in a lower asking price 
than the most recent recognized fair value, and (B) lower volatility will cause the asking price to 
increase from the most recent recognized fair value. The most recent recognized fair value for 
that use more conservative discretion treatments (Small CONS) was $13 million, and those that 
use less conservative discretion treatments (Large CONS) was $16 million. Table 14 reports the 
results of these tests that examines whether the asking price is significantly different from the 
most recent recognized fair value in each manipulation.  
Graduate students’ asking price increases from the recognized fair value of $16 million 
when less conservative discretion is used when volatility is low ($16.10 million, p = .671). 
Further, when more conservative discretion is used, graduate students’ increase their asking price 
from $13 million to $14.31 million (p < .01) when volatility is low. The results the student 
sample provide partial support for part B of hypothesis four  that less volatility will result in 
asking prices greater than the recognized fair value. These results also fail to provide support for 
part A of hypothesis four that greater volatility will lead to a decreased asking price. The student 
sample finds that high volatility significantly increases the asking price in both conservative 
treatments as opposed to decreasing the price as predicted (Small CONS =  $13.97 million,  p < 
.01;  Large CONS = $16.38 million,  p = .039).These results fail to support part A of hypothesis 
four.  
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Professionals’ asking price when volatility is low is increases from the most recent fair 
value in both conservative treatments (Small CONS average $13.55 million, p = .132; Large 
CONS average $15.77 million,  p = .432). However, the increase in the more conservative 
condition is not statistically different from the most recent recognized fair value and thus does 
not support part B of hypothesis four. Further, in when more conservative discretion is used 
(Small CONS), the increased volatility results in an asking price increase (from $13.55 million to 
$15.23 million), yet greater volatility decreases the asking price when less conservative 
discretion is used (Large CONS), from $15.77 million to $15.41 million. Though this increase is 
not significantly different from the $16 million recognized fair value (p = .266). Interestingly, 
high volatility significantly increases the asking price for more conservative fair values ($15.23 
million; p < .01), failing to support part A of hypothesis four. 
When less conservative discretion is used, the risk from volatility causes professionals to 
decrease their asking price. However, professionals increase their asking price when discretion 
that is more conservative is used to arrive at the fair value. This result may be attributed to 
motivated reasoning. As the fair value recognized and uncertainty from the volatility increases, 
managers are unable to justify that the value is a true representation of the underlying security 
and thus adjust their asking price. 
In summary, the graduate students do not support hypothesis four part A, more volatility 
decreases asking prices, and provide partial support for part B that less volatility increases asking 
prices. Accounting professionals did decrease their asking price when the securities have greater 
volatile Level 3 fair values when less conservative discretion is used, although the decrease is not 
significant. However, when more conservative discretion is used, the asking price increases. 
Thus, failing to support part A of hypothesis four. Further, professionals decrease their asking 
price when lower volatility is present when less conservative discretion is used but increase their 
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asking price when less conservative discretion is used. However, the asking price increase is not 
significant, failing to support part B of hypothesis four. These results are further explored in the 
supplemental analysis section.  
TABLE 14 
Comparing Asking Price Means to Most Recent Recognized Fair Value 
Panel A: Graduate Students 
 Small CONS ($13 million) 
Mean 
(Test statistic) 
Large CONS ($16 million) 
Mean 
(Test statistic) 
Low VOL $14.31 million 
(8.211***) 
$16.10 million 
(.429) 
High VOL $13.97 million 
(4.966 ***) 
$16.83 million 
(2.162**) 
Panel B: Professionals 
 Small CONS ($13 million) 
Mean 
(Test statistic) 
Large CONS ($16 million) 
Mean 
(Test statistic) 
Low VOL $13.55 million 
(1.573) 
$15.77 million 
(-.810) 
High VOL $15.23 million 
(5.684 ***) 
$15.41 million 
(-1.151) 
 Panel C: Combined Data: Professionals plus Graduate Students 
 Small CONS ($13 million) 
Mean 
Test statistic 
Large CONS ($16 million) 
Mean 
Test statistic 
Low VOL $14.03 million 
(6.064***) 
$15.99 million 
(-.061) 
High VOL $14.47 million 
(6.931 ***) 
$16.02 million 
(.723) 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
*, **, *** p < .10, .05, and .01, respectively 
 
Supplemental Analysis 
The supplemental analyses further assess the impact of the assumptions used in the 
hypotheses and attempt to explain the unexpected results. The results from the hypotheses tests 
suggest that the conservative levels and volatility affect managers’ selling decisions. However, 
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the results for hypothesis four provide unanticipated results. When volatility is present, the 
asking price increases significantly from the recognized fair value when more conservative 
discretion is used (Small CONS) for all three samples, and when less conservative discretion is 
used (Large CONS) only for graduate students. When the historical volatility is low, graduate 
students and the combination sample increases their asking price rather than decrease as 
predicted.  
To determine whether participants considered volatility when making selling decisions, 
the post-experimental debriefing questions are examined. Participants were asked to indicate 
whether the level of items within the case influenced their selling decisions. These questions 
include: (1) the conservative level, (2) the volatility, (3) the original purchase price, (4) the 
current fair value, (5) the accounting treatment of fair value accounting, and (6) the highest past 
recognized fair value. Each question requested that respondents indicate their level of agreement 
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) regarding whether that criteria was 
used in their decision-making. 
To examine the influences on asking price decisions, Preacher and Hayes’ PROCESS 
analysis is used to determine whether participants’ opinions mediated the association between 
the independent variables and asking price. Bootstrapping using 5000 replications is performed 
for the model that includes direct and indirect paths of the potential mediator to dependent 
variable. Table 15 reports the confidence intervals and p-values for each indirect association. If 
zero is not between the confidence interval of the indirect paths, then mediation is present. In 
addition, mediated moderated models are tested that use the interaction of the two dependent 
variables (CONS and VOL), post experimental items as the mediator and the asking price and 
selling likelihood as the dependent variable. This test is performed because assumptions used to 
arrive at the fair value affect both conservative level and volatility of the recognized fair value.  
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The results shown in Table 15 indicate that the post-experimental items fail to explain the 
associations between the dependent variables and asking price. Most importantly, the post 
experimental items show that participants’ did not perceive the historical volatility as important 
when making selling-decisions, contrary to the expectations hypothesized.   
The results from hypothesis two indicate that both graduate students and professionals are 
more likely to sell the security when less conservative discretion is used opposed to when more 
conservative discretion is used. Preacher and Hayes confidence interval bootstrap method was 
employed to determine whether participants opinions mediated the association between the 
dependent variables and likelihood of selling the Level 3 fair value security. The results posted 
on Panel C, Table 15 show that the participants’ opinions do not mediate the associations 
between the likelihood to sell the Level 3 fair value security and the dependent variables because 
all indirect results have confidence intervals that contain zero.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15 
Post-Experimental Items Bootstrap Confidence Interval Tests for Mediation 
Indirect Effects Results Reported 
 
Panel A:  Asking Price as Dependent Variable 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CON_OP & CONS -.063 .044 -302 .142 -.083 .029 
CON_OP & VOL -.082 .087 -.106 .127 -.406 .053 
VOL_OP & CONS -.049 .070 -.142 .230 -.042 .035 
VOL_OP & VOL -.062 .233 -.100 .242 -.069 .072 
HIST_OP & CONS -.089 .036 -.116 .084 -.070 .030 
HIST_OP & VOL -.051 .093 -.144 .134 -.036 .038 
ACT_OP & CONS -.054 .076 -.306 .073 -.082 .027 
 
 
69 
 
ACT_OP & VOL -.072 .091 -.127 .167 -.033 .043 
CUR_OP & CONS -.109 .083 -.432 .109 -.145 .022 
CUR_OP & VOL -.148 .062 -.134 .169 -.073 .051 
PAS_OP & CONS .028 .167 -.258 .063 -.073 .042 
PAS_OP & VOL -.162 .116 -.106 .156 -.035 .085 
Panel B: Asking Price as Dependent Variable: Mediated Moderator Model 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CON_OP & CON*VOL -.046 .078 -250 .213 -.052 .052 
VOL_OP & CON*VOL -.056 .138 -.151 .207 -.060 .045 
HIST_OP & CON*VOL -.090 .093 -.116 .126 -.059 .048 
ACT_OP & CON*VOL -.056 .145 -.184 .168 -.068 .056 
CUR_OP & CON*VOL -.222 .051 -.191 .169 -.130 .046 
PAS_OP & CON*VOL -.094 .205 -.171 .122 -.035 .085 
 
Panel C: Selling Likelihood as Dependent Variable 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CON_OP & CONS -.928 1.267 -1.139 4.920 -.506 1.233 
CON_OP & VOL -1.977 .645 -2.392 2.494 -1.154 .476 
VOL_OP & CONS -961 .931 -1.814 2.208 -.578 .582 
VOL_OP & VOL -3.012 1.220 -1.375 1.785 -1.538 .541 
HIST_OP & CONS -.653 2.757 -1.366 3.114 -.346 1.825 
HIST_OP & VOL -.707 1.762 -3.097 1.928 -582 1.219 
ACT_OP & CONS -.882 2.543 -2.401 2.530 -752 1.481 
ACT_OP & VOL -1.263 1.394 -1.348 2.339 -.567 .931 
CUR_OP & CONS -1.371 .974 -3.401 2.158 -1.197 .766 
CUR_OP & VOL -1.691 .881 -1.324 2.357 -.556 .661 
PAS_OP & CONS -2.255 .668 -2.052 3.057 -1.420 .468 
PAS_OP & VOL -.967 1.231 -2.712 1.499 -.576 .737 
Panel D: Selling Likelihood as Dependent Variable: Mediated Moderator Model 
Model Tested Graduate Students Professionals Combined 
Confidence Interval 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower- 
bound 
Upper-
bound 
CON_OP & CON*VOL -1.365 .992 -.896 6.092 -.585 1.278 
VOL_OP & CON*VOL -1.821 1.495 -1.835 1.803 -1.074 .632 
HIST_OP & CON*VOL -.828 2.689 -1.963 3.216 -.382 1.909 
ACT_OP & CON*VOL -1.543 2.569 -1.838 2.589 -.972 1.488 
CUR_OP & CON*VOL -2.643 1.131 -1.386 2.722 -1.121 .792 
PAS_OP & CON*VOL -2.21 .792 -2.283 2.492 -1.231 .471 
CON_OP:  opinion of whether the conservatism affected decisions 
VOL_OP: opinion of whether volatility affected decisions 
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HIST_OP: opinion of whether the historic cost affected decisions 
ACCT_OP: opinion of whether the accounting for fair value affected decisions 
CURR_OP: opinion of whether the current fair value affected decisions 
PAST_OP: opinion of whether the highest past fair value affected decisions 
CON: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
 
In order to determine whether the conservative level influenced selling choices and not 
the numeric values, the absolute value of the difference between the asking price and the 
recognized fair value is the dependent variable in an ANOVA with the conservative level and 
volatility as the independent variables. The ANOVA tests, on Panel B of Table 15, indicate that 
the conservative level of the discretion used influences graduate students’ departure from the 
recognized fair value when determining an asking price (F = 21.90, p <.01). Panel A of Table 15 
shows that graduate students’ asking price changes more when more conservative discretion is 
used, from $1,367,000 to $966,667 when volatility is low and decreases from $1,067,000 to 
$783,333 when volatility is high. 
 The results in Panel C and D, Table 16 show that the difference between the asking price 
and the recognized fair value is affected by the discretion used to determine the fair value (F = 
.3.03, p = .086) and volatility (F = 6.61, p <.01). These results suggest that accounting 
professionals’ asking price departs from their reference point, the recognized fair value, when 
selling a Level 3 fair value security based on the amount of discretion used to determine the fair 
value and the historical volatility. These results possibly explain why volatility did not influence 
professionals’ asking price in the main results section. The historical volatility pattern affects the 
difference between the asking price and the recognized fair value rather than the asking price as 
hypothesized.  
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Table 16 
Absolute Difference between Asking Price and Recognized Fair Value 
Panel A: Graduate Student Difference Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) 
T-test 
Low VOL $1,367,000 $966,667 1.931 * 
High VOL $1,067,000 $783,333 1.318 
T-test 1.338 .944  
Panel B: Graduate Student ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
Model 28.533 3 9.511 8.39  <.01 
CONS 24.819 1 24.819 21.90 <.01 
VOL .027 1 .027 .02 .878 
CONS*VOL 3.023 3 3.023 2.67 .105 
Error 136.016 120 1.133   
Panel C: Professional Difference Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) 
T-test 
Low VOL $550,000 $233,000 .915 
High VOL $2,225 $594,000 1.527 
T-test -2.455** -1.231  
Panel D: Professionals ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
Model 21.116 3 7.039 3.50 .020 
CONS 6.096 1 6.096 3.03 .086 
VOL 13.304 1 13.304 6.61 <.01 
CONS*VOL 1.267 1 1.267 0.63 .430 
Error 138.917 69 2.013   
 Panel E: Combined Sample Difference Means  
 More Conservative 
(Small CONS) 
Less Conservative 
(Large CONS) 
T-test 
Low VOL $1,287,037 $922,222 1.967* 
High VOL $1,550,000 $1,025,000 2.045** 
T-test -1.113 -.480  
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Panel D: Combined Sample ANOVA 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
Model 11.468 3 3.823 3.01 .031 
CONS 9.706 1 9.706 7.66 <.01 
VOL 1.640 1 1.640 1.29 .257 
CONS*VOL .315 1 .315 .25 .619 
Error 244.714 196 1.307   
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
*, **, *** p < .10, .05, and .01, respectively 
Post hoc Test 
 
Post hoc Tukey tests were performed in order to determine which treatments significantly 
differ from each other if interactions were significant in the hypotheses tests. In particular, this 
Tukey test determines whether the results from the hypotheses tests support the contention that 
accounting professionals’ asking price when selling Level 3 fair value securities are significantly 
impacted by the conservative level and volatility interaction that was identified in the 
professional sample and previously illustrated in Figure 2. According to the Tukey test on Panel 
A of Table 17,  professionals’ asking price to sell Level 3 fair value securities that use more 
conservative assumptions (small CONS) and have stable realized fair values (Low VOL) are 
statistically significantly different from the asking price in all other conditions (p <  .01). 
Furthermore, when less conservative discretion is used (Large CONS), the asking price 
difference in low volatility and high volatility lacks statistical significance (p = .905). 
The Tukey test using graduate students, on Table 17, Panel B, indicates that when more 
conservative discretion is used (Small CONS) the asking price is statistically different from 
conditions in which less conservative is used (Large CONS) when both high volatility (p < .01) 
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and low volatility (p < .01) is present. In summary, the supplemental analysis shows that 
graduate students and professionals use different information when making selling decisions 
regarding Level 3 fair securities.  
TABLE 17 
Post Hoc Tukey Tests for Significant Interactions 
Panel A: Professional sample and Asking Price as Dependent Variable 
Condition  Tested with Condition Mean difference Sig. 
Small CONS and Low VOL Small CONS and High VOL -1.67 <.01 
 Large CONS and High VOL -1.86 <.01 
 Large CONS and Low VOL -2.24 <.01 
Small CONS and High VOL Large CONS and High VOL -.18 .988 
 Large CONS and Low VOL -.57 .739 
Large CONS and High VOL Large CONS and Low VOL -.39 .905 
Panel B: Graduate student sample and Asking Price as Dependent Variable 
Condition  Tested with Condition Mean difference Sig. 
Small CONS and Low VOL Small CONS and High VOL .34 .576 
 Large CONS and High VOL -2.07 < 0.01 
 Large CONS and Low VOL -1.79 < 0.01 
Small CONS and High VOL Large CONS and High VOL -2.42 < 0.01 
 Large CONS and Low VOL -2.13 < 0.01 
Large CONS and High VOL Large CONS and Low VOL .28 .732 
CONS: Independent variable: 0 for more conservative and 1 less conservative assumption used 
VOL: Independent variable: 0 for low volatility and 1 for high volatility 
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V. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation examines how Level 3 fair value accounting affects investing decision-
making in order to acquire an understanding of the behavioral issues related to the discretion 
permitted for Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Extant scholarship supports the notion that 
fair value provides relevant information at the organizational level (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; 
Song et al. 2010; and Barth and Taylor 2010). Yet, few studies examine fair value accounting 
from a behavioral level (e.g., Chen et al. 2012; and Mildbradt 2012). Further, research has not 
examined the impact of fair value discretion on Level 3 fair value securities selling decisions. 
Using a case scenario, this study determines that when managers make selling decisions, 
the conservative level of the assumptions made to arrive at the fair value affects both their asking 
price and the lowest price they are willing to accept to sell the fair value asset. In addition, the 
conservative level and the historical volatility interact when professionals determine asking 
prices. Managers are more likely to sell a Level 3 fair value security when less conservative 
discretion is used. Yet, the likelihood of selling is not statistically different when more 
conservative discretion is used. This study also provides support that both graduate students and 
professionals are more likely to accept an offer that is below the recognized fair value when less 
discretion is used. Further, this study provides support that less volatility increases the asking 
price when more conservative discretion is used, but this effect is only significant for the 
graduate student sample. Lastly, greater volatility decreases professionals’ asking price when 
less conservative but the decrease is not statistically different from the recognized fair value.  
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Post hoc tests provide evidence that, when selecting an asking price, managers consider 
volatility when determining an asking price under the consideration of the departure from the 
recognized fair value. Managers do consider volatility coupled with the conservative level of the 
discretion used when selecting the asking price. However, the overall results of this study 
indicate that managers do not consider the volatility alone when determining the selling 
likelihood or the asking price. Thus, volatility, or uncertainty, is not the foremost consideration 
when making selling decisions but rather the discretion conservative level has more 
consideration in Level 3 fair value security selling decisions. 
This study also provides evidence that fair value provides relevant information to 
managers when determining an asking price and is therefore is an important component in the 
selling-decision processes. Graduate students and managers do not consider the conservative 
level of the discretion used to determine the fair value when deciding whether to sell the security. 
This may have negative repercussions in organizations. For example, if less conservative 
discretion is used to determine the fair value of a security, and the fair value does not accurately 
indicate the underlying value of the security, then inappropriate selling decision could occur. 
This may potentially result in retaining an over-valued security that artificially inflates the 
financial statements when selling the security may be in the organization’s best interest.  
The results in this study indicate potential problems for firms. Student loans are 
considered Level 3 fair value assets and are traded as investments. Similar to mortgage-back 
securities, institutions purchase student loans as investments and firms are allowed to use 
discretion to adjust the average value of their investments. According to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, delinquent student loans are 11.3% of the $1.16 trillion student debt on 
record (Shah 2015). Student loans are not expected to create another financial crisis because 
student loans consist of federal education loans and private alternative student loans. Prior to 
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2010, students’ loans were  made through banks. After 2010, government student loans issued 
through the Direct Loan program were made by the federal government (Federal Student Aid: 
An Office of the U.S. Department of Education, 2015). The amount of unsecuritized loans prior 
to 2010 is diminishing yet default is still possible. This can create fair value adjustments that 
result in biased financial statements. This occurs in illiquid markets when fair value accounting 
creates a downward bias because of the decrease that occurs from fair valuation adjustments 
from loan liabilities (AICPA 2003). Thus, when institutions use student loans in subsequent 
transactions, an increase in delinquency of the underlying investment will cause the fair value to 
decrease. The high default rates on student loans that are currently traded as Level 3 fair value 
securities between institutions creates a bias when the security is not re-valued to the appropriate 
amount. Thus, managers need to exercise caution not only when determining the fair value, but 
also when making selling decisions of these securities.   
The second problem that can occur when student loans default, is that the fair valuation 
models for these investments will have higher uncertainty. This results in adjustments to the 
valuation model that contributes to an increase in volatility of the recognized fair value. This 
study finds that managers do not use past volatility to determine an asking price or to assess 
whether to sell the Level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Therefore, managers need to be 
cautious of the potential implications volatility can cause.  
Fair value accounting needs to be exercised in organizations with care. The professional 
community criticized fair value accounting as playing a role in the 2008 Credit Crises (Walker 
2014). Many institutions relied on the last transaction price as a primary basis when determining 
fair value (AICPA: CAQ Auditing Library 2010). In addition, many firms had one-day gains 
immediately after the purchase from fair value adjustments (Walker 2014). From 2006 to 2008, 
the defaults on mortgages increased by 79%, (nearly 1.3 million properties) as a partial 
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consequence of inability to refinance at lower interest rates  (Walker, 2014). This caused many 
firms to lose billions of dollars because of overvalued fair value assets and eventual extensive 
write-downs. Student loans issued by banks are decreasing, and are not as large as mortgage-
backed securities. However, over-valuing these securities when the underlying value of the 
security is defaulted can result in negative implications for the investing firm especially when 
managers use the overvalued fair value amount (or less conservative discretion) to determine 
whether to sell and the asking price. By increased understanding of the consequences fair value 
assumptions have on manager selling decisions, organizations may be able to mitigate 
unintended consequences by implementing valuation policies.  
This study also adds to the discussion whether graduate students are proper surrogates for 
professionals in research. Prior literature has found that graduate students may be used as 
surrogates when the task is deemed is not complex nor require integration of requisite knowledge 
(Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk 2007; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 1995). Further, 
literature investigates how experience can create differences in judgements between graduate 
students and professional (e.g., Mortensen, Fisher, and Wines 2012; and Abdolmohammadi and 
Wright 1987). This study finds that in the fair value context, graduate students and professionals 
have similar asking prices when both more and less conservative discretion is used to determine 
the fair value. Though when uncertainty, volatility increases, the asking price between graduate 
students and professionals diverge. Thus, graduate students and professionals react to uncertainty 
differently. This may be attributed to the lack of fair accounting knowledge possessed by the 
graduate students. Mortensen et al. 2012 provide evidence that because of general domain 
knowledge similarities, accounting graduate students are valid surrogates for professionals. Yet, 
the graduate students indicated that only 4.80% have fair value experience, compared to the 
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entire professional sample possessing fair value accounting experience. This may account for the 
disparity between the groups.  
This study is also subject to limitations. Participants were asked to read an investment 
scenario and make selling decisions. They had no positive or negative consequences from their 
selling choices. By including a compensation component in the study, respondents may react 
differently. For instance, by selling the fair value security at a higher value would result in a 
larger gain, which could increase the managers’ compensation. Conversely, if the manager were 
to retain the security with the intention that the value will increase in the future, then financial 
ratios would remain constant and may affect compensation.  
Case materials were developed with the solicited advice of valuation experts to be 
realistic. Nevertheless, the scenario is more simplified than what would occur in an actual 
commercial enterprise setting. Managers would have access to other information and perhaps 
expert advice. Another limitation is that on average, 75% of the respondents indicated that they 
would sell the security. Perhaps greater tension in the scenario may produce a greater desire to 
retain the securities. For instance, if financial ratios negatively affected by the selling choice, 
then participants may have decided not to sell. In addition, due to the short nature of this study, 
around ten minutes, participants would not feel as committed to the firm and the selling decision 
as they would if they faced this decision in their job.  
Despite the limitations, this study provides insight on how discretion of Level 3 fair value 
assets and liabilities influences selling choices of these fair value securities. Future research 
could implement an economic experiment to examine the negotiation selling process. Studies 
could also examine how the option allowed by ASC 820 to value Level 3 securities at an 
aggregate or individual level impacts investing and reporting decisions. This study could also be 
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extended to include other factors that influence selling choices, such as firm characteristics or 
individual behavior traits. 
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APPENDIX A 
Invitation to Participate in Study 
Greetings, 
We invite you to participate in a study that examines fair value accounting and decision-making. 
This survey will take less than 10 minutes and will help our understanding of fair value 
discretion and selling choices. We appreciate your honest and accurate response to each 
question.  
All responses will be kept confidential and access to the data collected in this survey is limited to 
the two Virginia Commonwealth University project team members listed below. Your anonymity 
will be maintained during the data collection, analysis, and any publications or presentations of 
the results. No individual information will be collected that could link you to your responses. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may stop at any time. You may 
also decide not to answer a particular question. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please feel free to contact Karen 
Green at greenky@vcu.edu,  or Alisa Brink at agbrink@vcu.edu. 
Please feel free to keep this form for future reference.  
Thank you in advance for taking time to complete the survey. 
Regards,  
Karen Green, CPA 
Doctoral Candidate 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Alisa Brink, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Accounting  
Virginia Commonwealth University  
 
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by Virginia Commonwealth University’s Office of 
Research Subjects Projection. Study’s IRB reference number: HM20002111. 
 
If you have additional questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact: 
Office of Research Subjects Protection 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
800 East Leigh Street 
PO Box 980568 
Richmond, VA 23298 
Telephone: 804-827-2157 
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You may also contact this number if you have general questions, concerns, or complaints about 
the research. Please call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk to 
someone else. 
  
Treatment #1: Treatment Small CONS and Low VOL 
You are a manager at Super Financial Services Inc. (SFS). SFS is a medium sized, publically traded firm 
in the banking industry. In addition, SFS is a mature firm that has shown consistent growth since its 
incorporation.  
One of your duties as a manager includes investing in securities. On May 12, 2013, you invest in a pool of 
available-for-sale securities for $10,000,000, which is considered a substantial investment. These 
securities are classified as Level 3 securities because there are neither exact nor similar securities traded 
on the market. Therefore, when SFS makes fair value adjustments to these securities on their accounting 
records, they do not have guidance from the market. According to US GAAP, this means that SFS can use 
discretion to obtain the fair value of these Level 3 securities on their financial statements. 
The accounting process for available-for-sale securities require gains /losses from fair value adjustments 
to be recorded as unrealized gains / losses in Other Comprehensive Income. When selling these securities 
cash received will increase by the selling price and the security at the amortized cost is removed from the 
balance sheet. The difference is a realized gain / loss that is recognized in the Income Statement. The 
unrealized gains /losses and the fair value adjustment accounts are modified at year-end.  
When determining the fair value of Level 3 securities, following SFS’ policy, management uses the 
allowed discretion to value these securities conservatively (low) rather than non-conservatively (high). 
This selection is consistent with the discretion permitted by US GAAP in determining fair values for 
these securities. In addition, SFS uses an expert to determine that the discretion used to arrive at the fair 
value is valid.  
Over a year has passed since you purchased the Level 3 securities for $10,000,000 on May 12, 2013. 
Because SFS uses conservative (low) assumptions to value these securities, these assets have a fair 
value of $13,000,000 on the balance sheet. 
Due to the inputs received from the valuation expert and the company policies, the fair value recognized 
for all Level 3 securities historically has low volatility. Low volatility will cause the fair value of the 
Level 3 assets to be relatively stable over time. Thus, the history indicates that the market value changes 
are stable and if this pattern continues it may be roughly the same in the future. 
The table below illustrates the fair value and the unrealized gains / losses of the Level 3 securities you 
purchased on May 12, 2013 over the past 6 quarters to the most recent valuation of $13,000,000. 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
Treatment #2: Treatment Small Cons and High VOL 
You are a manager at Super Financial Services Inc. (SFS). SFS is a medium sized, publically traded firm 
in the banking industry. In addition, SFS is a mature firm that has shown consistent growth since its 
incorporation.  
One of your duties as a manager includes investing in securities. On May 12, 2013, you invest in a pool of 
available-for-sale securities for $10,000,000, which is considered a substantial investment. These 
securities are classified as Level 3 securities because there are neither exact nor similar securities traded 
on the market. Therefore, when SFS makes fair value adjustments to these securities on their accounting 
records, they do not have guidance from the market. According to US GAAP, this means that SFS can 
use discretion to obtain the fair value of these Level 3 securities on their financial statements. 
The accounting process for available-for-sale securities require gains /losses from fair value adjustments 
to be recorded as unrealized gains / losses in Other Comprehensive Income. When selling these securities 
cash received will increase by the selling price and the security at the amortized cost is removed from the 
balance sheet. The difference is a realized gain / loss that is recognized in the Income Statement. The 
unrealized gains /losses and the fair value adjustment accounts are modified at year-end.  
When determining the fair value of Level 3 securities, following SFS’ policy, management uses the 
allowed discretion to value these securities non-conservatively (high) rather than conservatively (low). 
This selection is consistent with the discretion permitted by US GAAP in determining fair values for 
these securities. In addition, SFS uses an expert to determine that the discretion used to arrive at the fair 
value is valid.  
Over a year has passed since you purchased the Level 3 securities for $10,000,000 on May 12, 2013. 
Because SFS uses non-conservative (high) assumptions to value these securities, these assets have a fair 
value of $16,000,000 on the balance sheet. 
Due to the inputs received from the valuation expert and the company policies, the fair value recognized 
for all Level 3 securities historically has low volatility. Low volatility will cause the fair value of the 
Level 3 assets to be relatively stable over time. Thus, the history indicates that the market value changes 
are stable and if this pattern continues it may be roughly the same in the future. 
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The table below illustrates the fair value and the unrealized gains / losses of the Level 3 securities you 
purchased on May 12, 2013 over the past 6 quarters to the most recent valuation of $16,000,000. 
 
SFS is now considering investing in a venture that requires a large amount of cash. You are examining the 
numerous investments you made for SFS to determine whether you can contribute to the project. You 
have a few options. One of your options is to sell the securities you purchased on May 12, 2013. 
Alternatively, you can sell other investments you made on behalf of SFS. 
 
Treatment #3: Treatment Large CONS and High VOL 
SFS is now considering investing in a venture that requires a large amount of cash. You are examining the 
numerous investments you made for SFS to determine whether you can contribute to the project. You 
have a few options. One of your options is to sell the securities you purchased on May 12, 2013. 
Alternatively, you can sell other investments you made on behalf of SFS. 
You are a manager at Super Financial Services Inc. (SFS). SFS is a medium sized, publically traded firm 
in the banking industry. In addition, SFS is a mature firm that has shown consistent growth since its 
incorporation.  
One of your duties as a manager includes investing in securities. On May 12, 2013, you invest in a pool of 
available-for-sale securities for $10,000,000, which is considered a substantial investment. These 
securities are classified as Level 3 securities because there are neither exact nor similar securities traded 
on the market. Therefore, when SFS makes fair value adjustments to these securities on their accounting 
records, they do not have guidance from the market. According to US GAAP, this means that SFS can 
use discretion to obtain the fair value of these Level 3 securities on their financial statements. 
The accounting process for available-for-sale securities require gains /losses from fair value adjustments 
to be recorded as unrealized gains / losses in Other Comprehensive Income. When selling these securities 
cash received will increase by the selling price and the security at the amortized cost is removed from the 
balance sheet. The difference is a realized gain / loss that is recognized in the Income Statement. The 
unrealized gains /losses and the fair value adjustment accounts are modified at year-end.  
When determining the fair value of Level 3 securities, following SFS’ policy, management uses the 
allowed discretion to value these securities non-conservatively (high) rather than conservatively (low). 
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This selection is consistent with the discretion permitted by US GAAP in determining fair values for 
these securities. In addition, SFS uses an expert to determine that the discretion used to arrive at the fair 
value is valid.  
Over a year has passed since you purchased the Level 3 securities for $10,000,000 on May 12, 2013. 
Because SFS uses non-conservative (high) assumptions to value these securities, these assets have a fair 
value of $16,000,000 on the balance sheet. 
Due to the inputs received from the valuation expert and the company policies, the fair value recognized 
for all Level 3 securities historically has high volatility. High volatility will cause the fair value of the 
Level 3 assets to be fluctuate over time. Thus, the history indicates that the market value changes are 
frequent and if this pattern continues it may be considerably different in the future. 
The table below illustrates the fair value and the unrealized gains / losses of the Level 3 securities you 
purchased on May 12, 2013 over the past 6 quarters to the most recent valuation of $16,000,000. 
 
SFS is now considering investing in a venture that requires a large amount of cash. You are examining the 
numerous investments you made for SFS to determine whether you can contribute to the project. You 
have a few options. One of your options is to sell the securities you purchased on May 12, 2013. 
Alternatively, you can sell other investments you made on behalf of SFS. 
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Treatment #4: Treatment Small CONS and High VOL 
You are a manager at Super Financial Services Inc. (SFS). SFS is a medium sized, publically traded firm 
in the banking industry. In addition, SFS is a mature firm that has shown consistent growth since its 
incorporation.  
One of your duties as a manager includes investing in securities. On May 12, 2013, you invest in a pool of 
available-for-sale securities for $10,000,000, which is considered a substantial investment. These 
securities are classified as Level 3 securities because there are neither exact nor similar securities traded 
on the market. Therefore, when SFS makes fair value adjustments to these securities on their accounting 
records, they do not have guidance from the market. According to US GAAP, this means that SFS can use 
discretion to obtain the fair value of these Level 3 securities on their financial statements. 
The accounting process for available-for-sale securities require gains /losses from fair value adjustments 
to be recorded as unrealized gains / losses in Other Comprehensive Income. When selling these securities 
cash received will increase by the selling price and the security at the amortized cost is removed from the 
balance sheet. The difference is a realized gain / loss that is recognized in the Income Statement. The 
unrealized gains /losses and the fair value adjustment accounts are modified at year-end.  
When determining the fair value of Level 3 securities, following SFS’ policy, management uses the 
allowed discretion to value these securities conservatively (low) rather than non-conservatively (high). 
This selection is consistent with the discretion permitted by US GAAP in determining fair values for 
these securities. In addition, SFS uses an expert to determine that the discretion used to arrive at the fair 
value is valid.  
Over a year has passed since you purchased the Level 3 securities for $10,000,000 on May 12, 2013. 
Because SFS uses conservative (low) assumptions to value these securities, these assets have a fair 
value of $13,000,000 on the balance sheet. 
Due to the inputs received from the valuation expert and the company policies, the fair value recognized 
for all Level 3 securities historically has high volatility. High volatility will cause the fair value of the 
Level 3 assets to be relatively fluctuate over time. Thus, the history indicates that the market value 
changes are frequent and if this pattern continues it may be considerably different in the future. 
The table below illustrates the fair value and the unrealized gains / losses of the Level 3 securities you 
purchased on May 12, 2013 over the past 6 quarters to the most recent valuation of $13,000,000. 
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SFS is now considering investing in a venture that requires a large amount of cash. You are examining the 
numerous investments you made for SFS to determine whether you can contribute to the project. You 
have a few options. One of your options is to sell the securities you purchased on May 12, 2013. 
Alternatively, you can sell other investments you made on behalf of SFS. 
 
 
1. SFS requires the fair value for Level 3 securities to be:  (check one) 
 ____ conservative (low) 
 ____ non-conservative (high) 
2. According to the case, the resulting volatility for fair value Level 3 securities is: (check one)  
  _____ low volatility 
  _____ high volatility   
 
3.What is the likelihood that you will sell the pool of securities? (Please circle percentage value) 
0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100% 
No Likelihood    Moderate    High Likelihood 
(Definitely would   Likelihood    (Definitely would 
not sell)          sell) 
 
4. If you were to sell the pool of securities you purchased on May 12, 2013, what would be your asking 
price?  (Please circle a value. Values are listed in millions of U.S. Dollars.) 
9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 14.5 15 15.5 16 16.5 17 17.5 18 
 
 
5.If you were to sell the pool of securities you purchased on May 12, 2013, what would be the lowest 
price you will accept? (Please circle a value. Values are listed in millions of U.S. Dollars.) 
9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 14.5 15 15.5 16 16.5 17 17.5 18 
 
6.If the market offers you $12,000,000, a price below the currently recognized fair value of $13,000,000, 
what is the likelihood that you would accept the offer? (Please circle one percentage value) 
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0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100% 
No Likelihood    Moderate    High Likelihood 
(Definitely would   Likelihood    (Definitely would 
not sell)          sell) 
 
Please rate the importance each statement influenced your selling decisions above: 
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7. Conservative fair value estimate 
selection. 
       
8. SFS’ record of low [high] volatility 
for Level 3 securities 
       
9. Historical cost of $10,000,000        
10. Current fair value of $13,000,000 
[$16,000,000] 
       
11. Gains / Losses  are not recognized on 
the income statement until sold 
       
12.  The highest PAST fair value of the 
security 
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You purchase a $2 lottery ticket. Assume that you must choose between two payouts. If you 
choose Option A, there is a chance that you will receive $2.00 and chance you will receive 
$1.60. However, if you choose Option B, you will play a lottery where there is a chance you will 
receive $3.85 and a chance you will receive $0.10.  
 
For each choice below, indicate whether you would pick Option A or Option B: 
 
   
Which Option would 
you pick? Check one 
box for each Choice. 
 
Option A:  
Lottery 
Option B:  
Lottery 
 
Option A Option B 
Choice 1 
10% chance of $2.00, 90% chance 
of $1.60  
10% chance of $3.85; 90% chance 
of $0.10  
 
 
Choice 2 
20% chance of $2.00, 80% chance 
of $1.60 
20% chance of $3.85; 80% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 3 
30% chance of $2.00, 70% chance 
of $1.60 
30% chance of $3.85; 70% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 4 
40% chance of $2.00, 60% chance 
of $1.60 
40% chance of $3.85; 60% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 5 
50% chance of $2.00, 50% chance 
of $1.60 
50% chance of $3.85; 50% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 6 
60% chance of $2.00, 40% chance 
of $1.60 
60% chance of $3.85; 40% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 7 
70% chance of $2.00, 30% chance 
of $1.60 
70% chance of $3.85; 30% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 8 
80% chance of $2.00, 20% chance 
of $1.60 
80% chance of $3.85; 20% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 9 
90% chance of $2.00, 10% chance 
of $1.60 
90% chance of $3.85; 10% chance 
of $0.10 
 
 
Choice 10 
100% chance of $2.00, 0% chance 
of $1.60 
100% chance of $3.85; 0% chance 
of $0.10 
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Please rate your agreement with each of the following statements: 
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1. In uncertain times, I usually expect 
the best.   
     
2. It's easy for me to relax.       
3. If something can go wrong for me, it 
will.  
     
4. I'm always optimistic about my 
future.  
     
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.        
6. It's important for me to keep busy.      
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my 
way. 
     
8. I don't get upset too easily.       
9. I rarely count on good things 
happening to me.  
     
10. Overall, I expect more good things to 
happen to me than bad. 
     
Do you have any work-related experience with fair value accounting: _____Yes  ______ No 
  
If so, please indicate the number of years:________ 
 
 
Have you received any training related to fair value accounting? _____Yes  ______ No 
 
 
Current job title:_________________________________________________ 
 
Number of years of professional experience:__________ 
 
Please indicate the approximate annual revenue of the firm that you work at (please check one): 
_____ under $1 million   _____$1-$10 million   _____$10-$100 million   
_____$100-$500 million _____$500 million - $1 billion _____over $1 billion  
 
What is your age:_________  What is your gender?  ______ Female   ______ Male 
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Gender as Covariate Output 
Asking price and lowest price willing to accept Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) 
Multivariate Univariate 
Effect Wilks’ λ df F-value Sig. ASK LOW 
Model .741 4 2.75 0.008 4.54 *** 1.81 
CONS .890 1 4.16 0.020 8.42 *** 3.74* 
VOL .951 1 1.72 0.187 2.57 .06 
CONS *VOL .912 1 3.24 0.045 6.17 ** 1.10 
GENDER .964 1 1.26 0.291 .02 1.38 
 
Selling Likelihood (SELL) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 718.992 1 718.992 1.11 .296 
VOL 755.865 1 755.865 1.17 .287 
CONS*VOL 267.128 1 267.128 .41 .523 
GENDER 744.939 1 744.937 .15 .281 
Error 43996.172 68 647.003   
 
Likelihood to Accept an Offer Lower than the Most Recognized Fair Value (LO_FV) 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F-statistic 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
CONS 12790.653 1 12790.653 15.16 <.01 
VOL 1020.450 1 1020.450 1.21 .275 
CONS *VOL 59.999 1 59.999 .07 .791 
GENDER 872.168 1 872.168 1.03 .313 
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